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Abstract 
US-led construction projects in Afghanistan have performed poorly on average; indeed, it 
is the norm to deliver projects late to need and over budget to the customer.  Using a 
dataset of 25 Afghan wartime projects, two separate, yet related questions relating to 
these DoD construction activities in the Afghan theater of operations were investigated.  
These questions are: 1) What factors affect the success of construction projects; and 2) 
How do project outcomes differ based on the contract type?  First, with regards to critical 
success factors, current literature suggests that wartime projects may face the same cost 
and schedule factors as peacetime projects, with some notable additions.  Using 
peacetime factors as a baseline, project factors, health and safety compliance, quality of 
work, technical performance, work productivity, and external environmental factors were 
tested with contingency tables to determine if they are predictive of schedule or cost 
performance.  External environmental factors, including weather and wartime security, 
were not predictive of project performance.  However, cost performance and schedule 
performance was found to be significantly dependent on government-issued excusable 
delays.  Moreover, project management deficiencies were predictive of poor schedule 
performance but not cost performance.  Second with regards to contract type, as the 
Afghan security condition was volatile, contracting officers dynamically used both 
reimbursable and fixed-price contracts in order to accomplish the mission. Using the 
Mann-Whitney tests, performance differences between contract types were explored.  
Reimbursable contracts were found to have significantly greater cost and  
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schedule growth. Additionally, fixed price projects were found to have more problems 
with design performance and contract management. There was no significant difference 
in overall project quality. In conclusion, cost monitoring from the owner and scrutiny of 
project management is critical to the success of reimbursable contracts, and technical 
performance monitoring is necessary to ensure that fixed-price projects meet deadlines.   
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To every construction engineer, project manager, and government representative who 
tries to do good when there is so much bad: This is for you. Keep fighting the good fight.  
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ANALYSIS OF AIR FORCE WARTIME CONTRACTED CONSTRUCTION 
PROJECT PERFORMANCE 
 
I.  Introduction 
Background 
Military construction is a critical support element to the establishment of a 
national defense system. Unfortunately, these construction projects are not immune to 
challenges, delays, and cost overruns, particularly in wartime construction environments. 
From the beginning of the nation-building effort, Afghanistan construction projects 
construction challenges and failure occur so frequently that they have become expectedly 
commonplace. Of the $100 billion allocated to the project by June 2014, $23.1 billion 
had been allocated for construction projects. The Departments of Defense and State have 
been responsible for the majority of the projects, and have most often utilized the Air 
Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC, and formerly known as the Air Force Center for 
Engineering and the Environment, or AFCEE) and the United States Corps of Engineers 
(USACE) as construction agents (Thibault, 2011). In 2007, AFCEC became a key 
construction agent for the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A), and the 
program is still in operation as of March 2015. As the client and recipient for this 
research, they wish to gain “lessons learned” that may benefit future projects, whether in 
Afghanistan or a different wartime location. This introduction provides a background of 
the problem for investigation, explains the sponsor’s need for the research, and finishes 
with a brief description of the scope and methodology for the paper. 
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The AFCEC program, though comparatively small in number of projects when 
compared with USACE, comprised a significant portion of the monetary allocation for 
construction. The program executed nearly $3 billion in construction from 2007 to 2014. 
The program used a heavy equipment repair and construction (HERC) contract, which 
consisted  of multiple pre-approved contractors. Unlike local contractors, commonly used 
by USACE, these HERC contractors were large construction companies with significant 
financial resources.  The HERC contract served as a competitive indefinite delivery 
indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract. The individual projects were tendered by AFCEC as 
task orders (although, in the remainder of this thesis, projects are also referred to as 
contracts). Much like USACE, the AFCEC program experienced significant challenges in 
cost and schedule growth, but their HERC model was also heralded as a program that had 
(until 2013) never terminated a contractor for default.  
Thus far, there is little research that provides insight into wartime construction 
challenges, including Afghanistan. Two studies have been performed analyzing 
construction challenges in Afghanistan. The first was sponsored by USACE and 
performed by Affleck et al. (2011) who surveyed construction personnel on the most 
common challenges. The second was another AFIT thesis by Jaszkowiak (2012) which 
analyzed USACE and AFCEC projects to find performance differences between firm 
fixed price (FFP) contracts and cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts (CPFF) using some 
quantitative data, but primarily personnel surveys. The results of these two research 
projects provide some insight, but many questions remain regarding causes of poor 
project performance, as well as performance differences between contract types. 
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Therefore, AFCEC has commissioned this thesis to gain further knowledge of 
construction difficulties on projects in Afghanistan. This thesis seeks to build upon the 
two previous research efforts for a more in-depth data analysis on 25 AFCEC 
construction projects.  
Problem Statement 
It has historically been very difficult to execute construction projects in wartime 
environments, and Afghanistan has been no exception to this trend. The AFCEC 
contracting system has used both FFP and CPFF contracts to execute projects, and both 
contract types have experienced severe difficulties. There are many factors and root 
causes from from which construction challenges can originate. However, there may also 
be predictive performance factors that will help project managers anticipate or overcome 
construction challenges. Moreover, there may also be performance differences in 
different contract types that will provide focus areas for government officials when 
auditing project progress. However, there is little knowledge of what these factors are in 
wartime construction projects. As such, there is not a consistent framework for 
government managers to scrutinize contractors in order to control costs and schedule. 
Research Objectives/Questions/Hypotheses 
The objective of this thesis is to understand which factors may be predictive of the 
construction budget and schedule performance in wartime projects. Additionally, it seeks 
to find significant performance differences between reimbursable and fixed price 
contracts. There are many performance metrics, such as cost, schedule, and quality. The 
literature review will provide guidance for performance measures by which these 
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challenges and differences can be analyzed. To answer these questions, this thesis uses 
the following major factors: Project Factors, Health and Safety, Quality, Technical 
Performance, and Productivity, and External Environmental Factors in wartime 
construction projects. Therefore, we seek to answer the following questions in the form 
of two scholarly articles: 
1) Which factors affect the success of wartime construction projects? 
2) How do wartime project outcomes differ based on the contract type?  
Scope and Methodology 
The in-depth data gathering is comprised of two primary investigations for each 
project. The first portion analyzes the invoicing and schedule history of the project to 
gain a thorough understands of all cost and schedule growth. The second portion surveys 
the daily reports for the projects during their respective courses of construction and 
identifies all major deficiencies. This deficiency data will be summarized and sorted into 
categories. These are the factor groups by which statistical analysis of project 
performance can be performed. 
The primary methods for statistical analysis of the data will be the contingency 
table (for Article 1) and the Mann-Whitney comparison of medians (for Article 2). It is 
not necessary to include detailed steps related to statistical methods in scholarly articles 
because it is assumed that readers of scholarly journals have some general understanding 
of the methodologies. Therefore, a slightly more detailed explanation of the methodology 
is contained in Chapter 5. 
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Significance 
There is almost very little research that captures mistakes and challenges in the 
Iraq wartime construction effort. Unfortunately, many of the same mistakes were 
repeated in the Afghanistan reconstruction effort. Improved knowledge of construction 
performance gives government officials better tools for decision-making and negotiating 
with contractors. This research will ideally precede an increased effort by US government 
agencies to seek out root causes of construction struggles in order to improve 
management and oversight for future projects. 
Preview 
This thesis uses the scholarly article format. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 are the 
articles produced from the research. They are both being prepared for submission to the 
following journals: Journal of Construction Engineering Management and Construction 
Management and Economics. The two articles will comprise the body of this thesis and 
contain the elements of research in the layout as per the journal submission requirements. 
They individually contain their own abstract, introduction, literature review, 
methodology, results, discussion, and conclusion. Chapter 4 contains additional 
discussion of the research methodology and results.  Chapter 5 contains a summary of the 
research effort, as well as findings and future research not discussed in the bodies of the 
articles themselves. 
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II. Scholarly Article 1: The influence of project and performance factors on 
construction performance: A wartime perspective 
Ryan M. Hoff; Gregory D. Hammond, Ph.D., P.E.; Peter P. Feng, Ph.D., P.E.; Edward D. 
White, Ph.D 
Abstract 
US-led construction projects in Afghanistan have performed poorly on-average; 
indeed, it is the norm to deliver projects late to need and over budget to the customer.  
Using a dataset of 25 Afghan wartime projects, we seek to find factors that affect the 
success of construction projects. Current literature suggests that wartime projects may 
face the same cost and schedule factors as peacetime projects, with some notable 
additions.  Using peacetime factors as a baseline, project factors, health and safety 
compliance, quality of work, technical performance, work productivity, and external 
environmental factors were tested with contingency tables to determine if they are 
predictive of schedule or cost performance.  We found that external environmental 
factors, to include weather and wartime security, were not predictive of project 
performance.  However, cost performance and schedule performance was found to be 
significantly dependent on government-issued excusable delays.  Moreover, project 
management deficiencies were predictive of poor schedule performance but not cost 
performance.   
Introduction 
The construction industry uses three primary, interrelated performance metrics to 
measure project performance: cost, quality, and time (Chan, et al., 2002). All three of 
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these metrics are interrelated. For example, poor schedule performance in construction 
can be a result of poor quality, thus requiring rework, which drives cost increases. 
Reichelt and Lyneis’ systems dynamics model found the relationship between project 
management, quality, work to be done, and rework, to be a very dynamic feedback 
process, containing many complex variables. Additionally, they found that increased 
pressure on a constructor to finish a project quickly creates positive and negative 
reactions (Reichelt & Lyneis, 1999). Similarly, Flyvbjerg also found that cost growth is 
dependent on schedule growth (2004). Even though the same potential for schedule and 
budget overruns exists on all projects, there is significant variance in the ultimate 
outcomes for each project. While this variance impedes the identification of global 
factors that influence cost, quality, and time (Reichelt & Lyneis, 1999) it is still possible 
for other researchers to perform identify factors within local jurisdictions. In general, the 
most cited causes of delay are engineering/design, external environmental factors, labor, 
material quality or material availability, project management, subcontractors, and weather 
(Al-Momani, 2000; Assaf & Al-Hejji, 2006; Mansfield, et al., 1994; Marzouk & El-
Rasas, 2014). These researchers have concluded that the initial risk of delay in a 
construction project is high, regardless of additional factors. However, when construction 
projects are executed in environments where risk factors are at a heightened state, such as 
Afghanistan, the schedule delay risk increases dramatically. (Affleck, et al., 2011; 
Kremers, et al., 2010) 
As of June 2014, the United States (US) had spent nearly $100 billion on the 
rebuilding effort in Afghanistan, and had allocated $23.1 billion specifically for 
construction projects (GAO, 2014). The Department of State and the Department of 
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Defense (DoD) have managed the majority of construction in Afghanistan. The two 
primary construction agents are the Air Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC) and the 
United States Corps of Engineers (USACE) (Thibault, 2011).  
Although it has long been established that Afghanistan projects have performed 
quite poorly on average (Thibault, 2011), there is neither research on primary causes of 
severe schedule delays for AFCEC projects nor quantitative research on wartime 
construction delays or budget problems. One of the largest operational differences 
between AFCEC and USACE is that AFCEC uses an Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite 
Quantity (IDIQ) contract with a pre-approved list of Western-owned prime contractors 
that have exclusive access to projects that are advertised from AFCEC. These prime 
contractors are then incentivized to hire local-national subcontractors in Afghanistan. In 
contract, USACE uses a firm fixed price (FFP) lowest-price technically acceptable 
competitive bidding system. Historically, USACE has been forced to terminate many 
failing projects, while, as of January 2015, AFCEC has only been forced to terminate one 
contract. Despite this high rate of project completion, AFCEC projects still experience 
high schedule and cost overruns. As previously stated, there are many factors that affect 
the performance of a project:  project management, procurement, external environment, 
procurement procedures, human-related factors, and project-related factors (e.g. scope, 
size) (Chan, et al., 2004). Currently, it is not known which factors play the largest role in 
the time delay of completion, especially in wartime construction projects. Therefore in 
this paper, we seek to understand how predictive of schedule or cost are project factors, 
health and safety, quality, technical performance, productivity, and external 
environmental factors in wartime construction projects? The factors listed in the research 
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question were chosen because they are most appropriate for a quantitative evaluation of 
project performance. Other factors are more appropriately evaluated through qualitative 
analysis and surveys. 
A small amount of research has been performed on construction challenges in 
Afghanistan; and most of it comes from government oversight agencies. The United 
States government provided extensive oversight to the Afghanistan reconstruction effort. 
Auditing agencies were the Commission on Wartime Contracting, Special Inspector 
General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), Government Accountability Office 
(GAO), and many others. This “in-house” oversight has served to reveal many of the 
setbacks and problem areas within the reconstruction; however none of the research has 
attempted to predict how these problems may be anticipated in the future. Thus far, 
SIGAR has published a number of case studies on specific projects that reveal mistakes 
and problems, but very little cause-effect analysis has been performed, and none of it has 
been quantitative. 
Additionally, very little research has been conducted to understand the root causes 
of delays in US-funded Afghan construction.  In 2010, USACE released a qualitative 
report on their managed projects in Afghanistan that drew upon interviews with their 
construction management team. Using interviews, Jaszkowiak (2012) investigated 
differences between AFCEC Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) and Firm-Fixed Price (FFP) 
contracts in Afghanistan. However, no quantitative research has been performed, for 
either USACE or AFCEC, to investigate the causes of schedule delays in Afghan 
projects. Studies modeling construction delays have already been performed in many 
countries (Al-Momani, 2000; Flyvbjerg, et al., 2004; Halligan, et al., 1994; Hoffman, et 
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al., 2007; Ng, et al., 2001; Reichelt & Lyneis, 1999; Skitmore & Ng, 2003); however, 
predictive models from other regions and external environments may not exhibit the same 
behavior of a wartime environment as Afghanistan.  
The data for this research effort comes from the AFCEC construction program. 
The data come primarily from the daily reports submitted to AFCEC by on-site Quality 
Assurance (QA) engineers. These reports contain quality shortfalls that the QA’s 
identified and reported to AFCEC. These reports contain many comments and 
observations regarding deficiencies and other project problems that can be used in 
statistical modeling, all of which ultimately may affect the progression of the project. The 
many combinations of different problems that occur in Afghanistan projects may form 
patterns which can be statistically shown to affect the schedule progress of the project.  
Literature Review 
The Air Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC) has been responsible for over $2 
Billion in construction for the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan. Through the 
course of the program, some projects performed well, and some projects performed 
poorly. But through it all, one primary question has been asked: how does a project 
manager recognize a quality project from a poor performing project? To this point, no 
research has been done for wartime projects that attempt to predict schedule performance. 
This research will use statistical tools to identify which factors are more closely 
correlated with schedule performance of these wartime construction projects. 
Researchers have used simple regression models to predict schedule and cost 
performance in construction projects. An early model, developed by Bromilow (1969), 
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using data from 309 Australian projects, predicted the construction time based on an 
exponential model that included three factors: cost of the project in millions of dollars, 
customer’s average time performance for a $1 million project, and a constant which 
describes the relationship between time and cost. In a recent test of the Bromilow’s time-
cost (BTC) model on 856 U.S. Air Force facilities constructed from 1988 to 2004, the 
model explained 37% of the variability. This is a notably high percentage, considering 
the complex nature of construction projects, which tends to inflate the variance 
(Hoffman, et al., 2007). Another study performed on a set of Australian projects further 
confirmed the accuracy of the model (although the curve coefficient behavior 
demonstrates a tendency to change with time and location) (Ng, et al., 2001). While 
Bromilow’s model is not applicable to this research, it further confirms that there is a 
strong relationship between schedule length and ultimate cost. This further emphasizes 
the need for a model that can explain schedule length.  
While Bomilow’s model may be useful for long-term costing for companies and 
clients, research suggests that project management and project decisions may benefit 
more from multivariate regression models. Russel and Zhai (1996) used multiple-
regression to predict contractor failure using economic and financial variables. The used 
economic factors for input variables, such as interest, value of the work after 
construction, and assets and working capital of the contractor. Their model successfully 
classified 18 of 23 contractors, 13 of which had failed (Russell & Zhai, 1996). 
Additionally, an Australian study performed by Skitmore and Ng (2003) used client 
sector, contractor selection method, contractual arrangement, project type, contract 
period, and contract ultimate cost to predict final cost of a set of residential projects. The 
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challenge with this and Bromilow’s model is that the final cost must be estimated for the 
project. Thal et al. (2010) used regression successfully to predict the final cost of 203 
construction projects for the purposes of allocating contingency funds. The researchers 
used normalized design length ratio, defined as the length of the design divided by the 
cost of the design, as one of the primary input variables. Other predictive input variables 
were the estimated and programmed costs respective to the actual cost awarded to the 
contractor.  
The literature review suggests that wartime projects face the same cost and 
schedule factors as peacetime projects with some notable additions. A review of multiple 
studies from other countries in surrounding regions shows that, while some minor causes 
of schedule delays tend to vary depending on culture and geographic location, major 
causes seem to hold constant across environments, namely: design problems, planning 
problems, weather interference, unskilled workers/quality problems, and difficulty 
working with the owner or lack of direction from the owner, and change orders or scope 
changes (Mansfield, et al., 1994; Assaf & Al-Hejji, 2006; Ibbs, 2012; Marzouk & El-
Rasas, 2014; Olima & K'akumu, 1999). Specific to Afghanistan, USACE is the only 
organization, thus far, that has published any researched causes for delay (Affleck, et al., 
2011). The researchers performed interviews and surveys with USACE personnel, as well 
as local national personnel who were involved in the construction process, to gain insight 
into key problems experienced during US-funded construction projects within 
Afghanistan. As can be seen in Table 1, Affleck found both parallels and unique 
conditions in Afghanistan relative to the broader literature review.   
  
13 
Table 1 – Qualitative Construction Problem Comparison 
Cause of Delay Middle East (Peacetime) Afghanistan 
Security Problems (theft and attacks)  X 
Physical Environment (Weather, Terrain) X X 
Cultural Environment  X 
Economic Environment X X 
Political Environment X X 
Poor Design X X 
Slow Design X  
Labor/Manpower Shortage X X 
Quality of Work X X 
Bidding System/Selection Process X  
Contractor Financial Problems X  
Material Supply Problems  X 
Poor Owner Management X X 
Poor Contractor Management X  
Corruption and Bribery  X 
 
The USACE survey found that security concerns such as theft and attacks to be 
the largest construction problem. It primarily occurred in the design and construction 
phases of the projects, and had a direct impact on material supply problems (Affleck, et 
al., 2011). This issue is not as prevalent in peacetime research. Berg, et al. (2005) 
interviewed 102 individuals in the American construction industry in order to determine 
average losses due to theft and vandalism on construction projects. Larger construction 
companies suffered more instances of theft, and smaller construction companies suffered 
more instances of vandalism. There was no significant trend to conclude that all 
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companies experience significant losses due to theft or vandalism. Indeed, many 
contractors do not seek claims for losses as they are below insurance deductibles. While 
theft can be a potential problem for construction projects, its impact seems to be greater 
in wartime than peacetime. 
 The physical environment is frequently cited  in both Afghanistan and industry 
literature. Afghanistan construction managers believed that there was often improper 
planning for weather conditions on the part of the contractor. These weather conditions 
ranged from heavy snow to heavy rain, and often were linked to the physical environment 
or terrain in the vicinity (flooding was a common problem). Low temperatures in some 
parts of the country were frequently cited (Affleck, et al., 2011). Industry research also 
shows that weather is a commonly cited factor. However, little mention is made with 
regard to weather planning; only poor weather at a greater frequency or severity than was 
anticipated (Sweis, et al., 2008; Assaf & Al-Hejji, 2006; Chan, et al., 2004). Typical 
construction contracts allow for severe weather as a noncompensable delay (Howell, 
1982-1983), which grants additional time for the contractor to finish the project, but no 
additional funding (Smith, Currie & Hancock, 2009; GSA, 1984). But there is no 
difference in opinion on weather’s effect of wartime and non-wartime projects. 
The next problem found by USACE was the incompatibility of western 
requirements with the culture of Afghanistan. This incompatibility either rendered the 
project useless to the end-user, or it required significant rework in both design and 
construction phases. Frequent turnover of USACE personnel in and out of Afghanistan, 
as well as jobsite safety, were also listed as significant problems (Affleck, et al., 2011). 
While the cultural environment is briefly mentioned by Chan (2004) when discussing all 
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factors that may affect a construction project, it typically is not mentioned as a significant 
influence. Research has shown that cultural effects can have significant effects in 
construction, especially when there are distinct cultural and ethnic differences between 
the project management team and the indigenous population.  Kremers found cultural 
effect magnified construction problems in wartime projects.  (Kremers, et al., 2010). 
Pheng and Yuquan studied the Singaporean and Chinese construction industries, which 
often are forced into cooperative situations. The cultural difference between people of the 
two countries were significant, and in order to aid productivity, both groups were forced 
to make significant changes and concessions (Pheng & Yuquan, 2002). Moreover, Baba 
found significant cultural differences between western and eastern cultures construction 
management techniques.  (Baba, 1996). Additionally, a study of dispute resolution in 
foreign-related Chinese projects found distinct differences between western cultures 
methods of executing contracts and resolving problems; particularly in legal 
matters(Chan, 1997). Therefore, while there is no specific evidence to highlight the effect 
of cultural differences on project performance, related research suggests that cultural 
differences may be a significant factor on project performance in wartime projects.   
The bidding process has frequently been cited in the construction industry as a 
primary cause of project problems. Simply put, the traditional policy of “lowest bid wins” 
frequently results in the contractor underbidding. (Assaf & Al-Hejji, 2006; Sweis, et al., 
2008) Consequently, Assaf and Al-Hejji have found associations between the bidding 
process and the contractor’s financial problems. (Assaf & Al-Hejji, 2006) Despite these 
well-known behavior patterns seen in the construction industry, these problems were not 
mentioned in the Afghan USACE report.  
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Material supply problems were cited in the USACE study as a significant cause of 
problems, namely due to the remote nature of Afghanistan itself. Quality materials are 
difficult to acquire there, and usually need to be imported. (Affleck, et al., 2011) Industry 
research does not make mention of this problem in association with frequent project 
delays, which is logical, considering that Afghanistan is among the remotest and harshest 
of construction environments. 
Of the last two differences in Table 1, one was mentioned in industry literature, 
and one mentioned in the USACE study. The first was poor project management, which 
has been a focus of the construction industry for some time (Chan, et al., 2004; Sweis, et 
al., 2008). However, it is interesting that the Afghanistan study made no mention of poor 
project management from the contractor or government, which has been a notable 
problem in the Afghanistan reconstruction effort for some time (Kremers, et al., 2010; 
GAO, 2014; Thibault, 2011). The final difference, corruption and bribery, was mentioned 
in the USACE study as well as by Kremers (2010), but not industry literature. This 
problem is cultural in nature, and usually was tied to the either the local populace 
surrounding the project, or the local governmental or military authority. Therefore, it 
makes sense why this problem was not mentioned in the industry literature for more 
developed and less war-torn countries. It will be important to consider this problem in 
future reconstruction efforts, particularly due to the nature of war and how it affects 
business ventures such as construction projects (Kremers, et al., 2010).  
There is a small amount of research which attempts to predict construction budget 
or schedule failure. A quantitative model by Russell & Jaselskis (1992) successfully 
predicted construction failure in 15 of 17 failed projects. Additionally, it correctly 
17 
predicted success in 16 of 19 successful projects. The predictive factors used were, owner 
evaluation of the contractor, cost monitoring performed by the owner, contractor project 
manager support by senior management, and early contractor project manager 
involvement. They recommended that owners develop robust systems for evaluating 
contractors prior to award, and also for closely monitoring costs and expenditures 
(Russell & Jaselskis, 1992). In a separate study, Russell & Jaselskis (1992) also 
performed an evaluation of failed projects to compare project failure criteria for 
evaluating on-going projects. For public projects, they found that the initial cost and 
estimated duration were both shorter for failure cases. However failed projects’ increase 
percent in cost was over five times that of successful projects, and schedule growth more 
than three times greater. Cost and safety monitoring was also significantly lower for 
failed projects than successful projects. They also suggested the development of more 
robust evaluation procedures for contractors in public contracts but admitted that this 
process may encounter legal and political challenges (Russell & Jaselskis, 1992). In 
support of these results, Severson et al. (1994) used contractor finance data to predict 
whether or not a contractor would breach a contract and be forced to resort to bond 
claims. Their results further supported the recommendation that, to reduce the probability 
of default, owners should thoroughly evaluate contractors prior to award. 
With regard to quantitative construction research in eastern countries, only one 
basic study was found. Al-Momani (2000) performed a study in Jordan using 130 
projects of differing categories (residential, administrative, school, medical, and 
communication) to determine delay cause and time impact. He found that 24.6% 
experienced delays from poor design, and 15.4% experienced delays from change orders. 
18 
Overall, all project genres had a mean actual completion time significantly longer than 
the planned completion (Al-Momani, 2000). 
Another method to determine inputs for a model is using key performance 
indicators (KPIs) identified in current literature. Chan’s meta-analysis of KPIs found that 
time and cost are the primary objective indicators of a successful project and health, 
safety, and financial performance are secondary indicators.  Additionally, his study found 
quality to be the primary subjective indicator of a successful project with customer 
satisfaction, technical performance, and productivity as secondary indicators (Chan 
2002).  To achieve project success, Chan et al (2004) identified five general categories of 
factors: project management actions, project procedures (procurement and tendering), 
external environment, human-related factors, and project-related factors (i.e. type, nature, 
size, number of floors, and complexity). Gonzales et al. (2014) also developed a 
qualitative framework by which researchers can evaluate root causes of delays in 
construction projects. They tested their methodology on three projects and found that 
planning, subcontracts, labor, and materials were the top reasons why the projects had 
been delayed. They admitted that it was not possible to perform causational analysis from 
the frequency of problems alone. Quantitative analysis is required for causation to be 
inferred. However, their results provide a helpful means by which to investigate root 
causes of delays (González, et al., 2014). 
Ultimately, there exists a lot of research that uses qualitative study or linear 
regression to determine general causes of delay; unfortunately there does not appear to be 
significant research that attempts to use more specific variables to predict construction 
delays. Therefore, this research will be exploratory in nature, and will seek to find 
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specific factors that are predictive of project progress. Because no significant research 
has been performed in this area to develop a methodology successfully, this paper will 
use independent variables from a variety of research: past linear regression studies, key 
performance indicator studies, surveys of experts that indicate primary causes of delays, 
and root-cause analysis case studies.  
Methodology 
The analysis explored construction inspection reports from 25 AFCEC projects 
using contingency tables to determine if project factors, health and safety, quality, 
technical performance, and productivity, and external environmental factors are 
predictive of schedule or cost performance in wartime construction projects. This 
research focuses on three primary aspects of the data: project factors, performance 
factors, and environmental factors. The project factors are basic metadata with regard to 
each project. Examples are award, contract length, and number of contract modifications. 
Performance factors are related to major construction, design, and material, deficiencies 
cited by the quality assurance engineer. Environmental factors are related to all external 
environmental factors which are outside the control of the contractor. Examples are 
weather, interference from locals, and security threats. All the factors were analyzed to 
investigate the effect on the schedule and cost. Input factors for analysis were developed 
based on a combination of the literature review and a basic breakdown of construction 
discipline types. They are shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2 – Analysis Factors 
Project Factors 
Award Amount 
Final Cost 
Awarded Cost Growth (Index) 
Number of Contract Modifications 
Number of Change Orders (Scope Changes) 
Initial Period of Performance 
Initial Period of Performance 
Final Period of Performance 
Awarded Schedule Growth (Index) 
 
 
Performance Factors 
Quality Factors 
Horizontal work (Concrete and/or Asphalt) 
Building Foundation (Concrete/Rebar/Soils) 
Electrical (High and Low Voltage, Comm Lines/Outlets) 
Mechanical (HVAC, Gas, Boilers) 
Utility (Water, Sewer, and Storm) 
Structural (Masonry, Steel, and Wood) 
Interior Finishing (Doors, Tiles, Walls, Ceilings, Bathroom Fixtures, Paint) 
Exterior finishing (Windows, Exterior doors, Garage Doors, Fences) 
Technical Performance Factors 
Design Performance 
Material/Submittals 
Health and Safety 
Safety Incidents and/or Deficiencies 
 
 
External Environmental Factors 
Region of Afghanistan 
Security Incidents 
Other External Environment Issues 
Weather 
 
21 
 The primary data source for this research was the daily reports, provided 
by the quality assurance engineer, for each of the 25 projects. Each report contains 
significant project factors, quality discussion (positive and negative), incidents, mishaps, 
safety information, progress information, and more. The average award cost was $25.5 
million, and the average final cost of the projects was $33.2 million. The majority of the 
projects focused on vertical construction, with some horizontal construction. Table 3 
provides summary data regarding the projects.   
The daily quality reports were coded by type of factor (cf. Table 2) yielding the 
independent variables for this study. When an occurrence of a factor was encountered in 
the review of the daily reports, the incident was recorded. Each occurrence was 
independently linked to the project and all of the meta-data associated with that project. 
This allowed for a summary coding for each project, which then allowed for 
differentiation between projects, based on cost and schedule performance.  
Table 3 – Project Data 
Project Information Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Award Amount $25.5 M $17.0 M $21.4 M 
Final Cost $33.2 M $23.9 M $28.7 M 
Number of Contract Modifications 8.73 7 3.94 
Change Orders (Scope Changes) 2.93 2 2.40 
Initial Period of Performance 383 365 145 
Final Period of Performance 823 741 354 
 
Weather was the most commonly reported external environment issue, followed 
by security incidents, and then any other external environmental issue, which ranged 
from locals and the Afghan National Army interfering with the project, to a swine flu 
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outbreak halting progress on several projects for multiple days. Most projects had fewer 
than 40 days of weather delays. The maximum number of delays days due to security was 
18,  however, the majority of the projects had fewer than 6 days cited. A summary is 
shown in Table 4. 
Table 4 – External Environmental 
Factor Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Security Incidents (days lost) 5.32 3 6.08 
Other external environmental issues (days lost) 6.60 1 11.70 
Weather (days lost) 20.32 12 21.95 
 
 There was also significant variance in the number of performance deficiencies 
noted between the projects. The most common performance problems were with the 
design and material submittals of the project. Because of the thorough government 
review system, there were no recorded incidents of poor engineering, which led to a 
failure. However, as a corollary, the most common problem was contractors submitting 
finalized designs that did not address all the review comments, causing many 
unnecessary review/resubmit cycles.  The majority of projects had between 0 and 15 
design performance incidents, with one project that had 31.. For material and submittal 
deficiencies, the contractor was often late in submitting material submittals, and also 
commonly ordered materials that did not coincide with the original submittal. However, 
most projects maintained an incident rate of 5 or less, with three projects being above 
that, and one as high as 24. 
Of the eight quality factors, four had significant variance.  The most common 
quality problem was electrical work (M=4.0, SD = 6.72) (both high and low voltage). 
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The project with the most electrical problems had 28 recorded incidents.   Rate of 
electrical incidents were slightly more distributed (between 0 and 20), and the highest 
count was 28 incidents.  Structural issues were reported second most commonly (M=3.0, 
SD = 4.85), the projects with the most structural issues had respectively 14 and 20 
incidents.. Foundation problems were also common (M = 2.7, SD = 5.8); most projects 
did not have many foundation problems, but two projects had 12 and 28 respectively.  
Lastly, utility issues (M = 1.7, SD = 2.72) had two outliers with 8 and 11 incidents.  A 
summary of project performance is provided in Table 5.  
Table 5 – Project Performance Summary 
Deficiencies (No. of occurrences) Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Project Management 1.37 0 2.06 
Contract Management 1.70 0 2.75 
Design Performance 6.52 5 6.51 
Material & Submittals 4.07 2 4.95 
Safety Deficiencies 2.56 1 5.22 
Reportable Safety Incidents 0.76 0 1.33 
Horizontal work  0.78 0 1.90 
Building Foundation  2.70 1 5.77 
Electrical  4.00 1 6.72 
Mechanical  0.52 0 0.90 
Utility 1.74 1 2.72 
Structural 3.00 1 4.85 
Interior Finishing 0.85 0 1.37 
Exterior finishing 0.48 0 0.56 
  
The data was coded by type of factor. Each factor was assigned a number, and 
when an occurrence of a factor is encountered in the review of the daily reports, the 
number will be assigned to that specific day of the project. Each occurrence was 
independently linked to the project and all of the meta-data associated with that project. 
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This allowed for a summary coding for each project, which will then allow for easy 
differentiation between projects, based on cost and schedule performance.  
The contingency tables were used to test independence between the project 
factors (cf. Table 2) and cost or schedule. Contingency tables use categorical variables to 
sort occurrences of incidents, and then create marginal probabilities. They then use a 
multinomial experiment that tests for independence between the categorical outcomes 
(McClave, et al., 2011). They are a common tool for analyzing categorical data where the 
researcher is trying to determine the dependence versus independence.  The Fisher’s 
exact test was used to analyze the contingency tables due to the small sample size.  
Contingency tables have been used to analyze procurement methods in the construction 
industry to determine which factors are most predictive of overall schedule performance 
(the study was not able to show any dependent factors with regard to cost) (Naoum, 
1994). Likewise, Cheng, et al. (2010) used contingency tables combined with other 
descriptive statistics to determine factors that cause construction accidents for small 
companies in Taiwan.  
As contingency tables require categorical data, the project factor  quantitative data 
was converted into qualitative categories. Every category had a large grouping of 
incidents of a certain deficiency (usually ranging from 0 to as high as 5 incidents), and 
each distribution had several outlier projects. The major “breakpoint” (where the largest 
grouping of projects ended) was nearly always at the 75th percentile; although there were 
some cases when it was at the 50th percentile. These breakpoints then served as the 
means of determining whether a project possessed a “normal” value for that factor or not.  
The breakpoints for all factors are shown in Table 6 (note that unless otherwise indicated, 
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the units reference to the number of incidents). When a project’s factor was less than or 
equal to the breakpoint, the project was nominally coded with a “0”. When a factor was 
greater than the breakpoint, the project was assigned a “1”. These assignments 
determined which row of the table a project would be assigned to (e.g. a project which 
had even one reportable safety incident would be assigned a 1, because it had greater than 
0 reportable safety incidents). To determined the column, projects which performed 
within budget were assigned a “1”, and assigned a “0” if over-budget. Projects that met 
their contractual schedule requirements were assigned a “1”, and those that did not were 
given a “0”.  
The dependent variables for this study were calculated based on schedule and cost 
performance; they were considered either behind schedule or ahead of schedule/ on-
schedule and over budget or within budget.  As no two projects are alike in their project 
performance, the amount that a project finished ahead of or behind schedule was 
normalized to an index (e.g., contract 365 / actual 400 = 1.2) The index was shown as a 
distribution and analyzed for “break points” where there is a natural divide between 
certain severities of behind or ahead of schedule to provide qualitative categories from 
which the quantitative response variables were separated. Additionally, to subjectively 
evaluate the joint budget and schedule of projects, earned-value analysis was performed 
by using either iterative schedule updates, or the invoice account data, both provided by 
the construction agent. The earned value plot was measured to determine the percent of 
the total duration that a project was over-budget or under-budget, as well as for schedule. 
Additionally, the quality assurance engineering performed multiple evaluations of the 
project schedule, as well as their own evaluations of the earned value. Their qualitative 
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comments were extracted from the daily reports. As a final step, the general classification 
was validated by the construction agent for accuracy.  
 
Table 6 – Nominal Break Points 
Project Information Break Point 
Award Amount $19 M 
Final Cost  $21.19 M 
Awarded Cost Growth (Index) 1.26 
Number of Contract Modifications 9 
Initial Period of Performance 868 days 
Final Period of Performance 842 days 
Awarded Schedule Growth (Index) 2.2 
Security Incidents 5 days 
Other external environmental issue 8 days 
Weather 19 days 
Project Management 1 
Contract Management 2 
Design Performance 5 
Material & Submittals 5 
Safety Deficiencies 3 
Reportable Safety Incidents 0 
Horizontal work  1 
Building Foundation  2 
Electrical  4 
Mechanical  0 
Utility 2 
Structural 2 
Interior Finishing 1 
Exterior finishing 0 
 
Results 
Four factors had a causal relationship with cost or schedule growth, each with one 
degree of freedom. Cost growth was predicted by awarded schedule growth and the final 
project, and cost growth was reduced by mechanical issues. Schedule growth was 
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predicted by awarded schedule growth and project management issues. Budget 
performance was dependent on the final cost of the project, but not the awarded cost. 
Budget performance was also found to be positively dependent on the presence of 
mechanical issues, implying a project’s budget performance improved given the presence 
of HVAC deficiencies. Awarded schedule growth was predictive of both cost and 
schedule growth. Awarded schedule growth occurred when the government awarded the 
contractor uncompensable excusable delays or additional time for scope changes.  Thus, 
projects were more likely to be over-budget when additional time was granted to 
complete the project. Lastly, schedule performance was also dependent on whether or not 
the project experienced project management-related issues.  
Table 7 – Contingency Table Results for Budget Performance 
Level 
Over Budget 
(n=10) 
Within Budget 
(n=15) 
Fisher’s test 
p-value 
Final Cost ≤ $21.19M 4.0% 32.0% 
0.0405 
Final Cost > $21.19M 36.0% 28.0% 
Awarded Schedule Growth ≤ 2.2 8.0% 44.0% 
0.0154 
Awarded Schedule Growth > 2.2 32.0% 16.0% 
Mechanical issues = 0 40.0% 32.0% 
0.0202 
Mechanical issues > 0 0% 28.0% 
 
Table 8 – Contingency Table Results for Schedule Performance 
Level 
Over Schedule 
(n=15) 
Within Schedule 
(n=10) 
Fisher’s test 
p-value 
Awarded Schedule Growth ≤ 2.2 20.0% 32.0% 
0.0414 
Awarded Schedule Growth > 2.2 40.0% 8.0% 
Project Management issues ≤ 1 28.0% 36.0% 
0.0405 
Project Management issues > 1 32.0% 4.0% 
 
28 
 While correlation is not causation, correlation tests were conducted to further 
explain the common trends among the study variables and to identify factors that may 
have indirect relationships.  Table 9 shows statistically significant correlations that are 
related to the primary factors that may possess an indirect relationship with schedule or 
budget performance. 
 
Table 9 – Kendall's Correlation Test (Secondary Factors) 
Variable by Variable 
Kendall 
T 
Prob 
>|T| 
Awarded Schedule Growth 
(Index) Final Period of Performance 0.3533 0.0133 
Final Period of Performance Final Cost 0.54 0.0002 
Final Period of Performance Initial Period of Performance 0.4348 0.0024 
Final Period of Performance Award Amount 0.42 0.0033 
Final Period of Performance Number of Contract Modifications 0.3267 0.0267 
Initial Period of Performance  Final Cost 0.3545 0.0133 
Interior Finishing Mechanical 0.44 0.0165 
Mechanical Material & Submittals 0.3985 0.0216 
Mechanical Safety Deficiencies 0.3851 0.0297 
Number of Contract Modifications Final Cost 0.3406 0.0209 
Number of Contract Modifications Award Amount 0.2919 0.0477 
Utility Mechanical 0.4838 0.0064 
 
Discussion 
The predictive factors for schedule and budget performance are those commonly 
seen in peacetime projects. Project management issues and awarded schedule growth is 
predictive of schedule performance problems; final cost and awarded schedule growth are 
predictive of budget performance problems. Correlation results agreed with the 
29 
contingency table results and provided additional insight regarding the relationships. The 
external environment factors were not found to have a significant effect. 
Performance Factors. 
The significant effect that management can have on the performance of a project 
should never be underestimated. The contingency tables showed that project management 
deficiencies are predictive of schedule performance, p < 0.05, which was the only 
significant performance-related factor. This confirms what previous researchers have 
stated about the criticality of project management in the overall performance of a project 
(Assaf & Al-Hejji, 2006; Chan, et al., 2004). Project management deficiencies also 
correlated negatively with schedule performance, r = -0.36, p < 0.05. The more project 
management deficiencies that were cited by QA engineers, the more likely it was that a 
project would be behind schedule. 
Cost. 
The contingency tables found dependency between the project’s final cost (above 
or below $21.19M) and its budget performance, p = 0.04. However, no relationship was 
found based on the initial cost of the project; p = 0.11. Thus, the data does not seem to 
suggest that higher-cost projects are inherently at a higher risk of budget overruns; 
instead, it suggests that there is a second-order effect causing the budget performance 
issues. One possible mediating factor is contract modifications. They were correlated to 
both the award amount, r = 0.29, p < 0.05, and the final cost of projects, r = 0.34,  
p < 0.05. Final period of performance also increased whenever contract modifications 
were introduced, r = 0.33, p < 0.05. Additionally, final cost was shown to correlate 
significantly with both the initial, r = 0.35, p < 0.05, and the final period of performance, 
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r = 0.54, p < 0.001, showing there may be a triangular relationship between cost, 
schedule, and contract modifications. These relationships may imply that the number of 
contract modifications increases with project scope and not solely cost growth. However, 
the price increases that inevitably come with changes appear to be stronger in the final 
cost of the project than the initial award amount. This could confirm the traditional theory 
that contractors bid low to win a project with the intent of “making it up with change 
orders”; or it could simply recognize that larger projects tend to be more complex and 
have more risk for change. Ultimately, as has been shown in previous studies (Assaf & 
Al-Hejji, 2006; Chan, et al., 2004; Mansfield, et al., 1994), there remains a connection 
between contract modifications and cost measures. 
Awarded Schedule Growth. 
Another result of the study is the dependent relationship that schedule and cost 
performance has with the allowance of additional time to construct a project p < 0.05 for 
both cases. Not surprisingly, given the construction location and wartime environment, 
every project was granted some additional time to finish by the contracting officer. Yet 
this practice increased the likelihood that a project would be considered late and over-
budget. Additionally, correlation for cost performance supported the contingency table 
results, r = -0.43, p = 0.01.  An interview with the AFCEC program manager confirmed 
these empirical results.  The contractors in Afghanistan would often struggle to regain 
momentum when they experienced some kind of delay; even when the delay was 
compensable or excusable. Oftentimes, if the delay was compensable, contractors would 
end up fronting money to keep the project functioning while the government arranged 
proper compensation. But the contractor would sometimes lose too much capital, which 
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then required them to lay-off staff and labor (Schoenenberger, 2014). This also may 
indirectly caused delays.  
Period of performance. 
The final period of performance correlated significantly with multiple factors: 
final cost, r = 0.54, p < 0.05, award amounts, r = 0.42, p < 0.05 the number of contract 
modifications, r = 0.32, p < 0.05, awarded schedule growth, r = 0.35, p < 0.05, and initial 
period of performance, r = 0.43, p < 0.05. It is easy to dismiss the latter two factors 
because the schedule ought to correlate with other schedule factors. However, the 
relationships between two cost factors, initial and final cost, the initial performance 
period also correlating with final cost, as well as the number of modifications received 
within a project, may imply that the final length of a project could be predicted by a 
regression equation involving these factors. This has been done recently for peacetime 
federal projects by Hoffman, et al. (2007) and was first done by Bromilow (1969). 
Unfortunately, the population size for this study was not large enough to perform 
regression analysis. However, these results imply that wartime project could use 
peacetime factors to predict the total time to construct with some amount of accuracy. If 
this research were performed real-time in future long-term wartime construction efforts, a 
prediction model could be built and updated to increase accurate predictions for 
beneficial occupancy dates. 
Mechanical. 
 In the contingency table tests, budget performance was shown to be positively 
dependent on mechanical deficiencies, p = 0.02. All of the projects that experienced 
mechanical difficulties were within budget parameters. It is unknown why the 
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relationship between budget performances improved with mechanical problems; to 
investigate possible causality sources, correlation tests were performed.  Mechanical 
issues correlated positively with safety deficiencies, r = 0.38, p < 0.05, material and 
submittal problems, r = 0.39, p < 0.05, interior finishing deficiencies, r = 0.44, p < 0.05 
and utility deficiencies r = 0.48, p < 0.05. Based on these findings, causality was tested 
using contingency tables.  Structural and interior finishing deficiencies were found to be 
significant, p = 0.02 and p < 0.01, respectively.  Unfortunately, this did not explain the 
relationship between mechanical deficiencies and budget performance. 
Mentionable Lack of Results. 
 Weather was not found to be a significant factor.  The breakpoint was determined 
to be at 19 days of delay, roughly the same as the mean (M = 20.2, SD = 22.0).  Seven 
projects had less than 19 days of delay and 18 projects had more.  Projects determined to 
have more severe weather delays ranged from 22 days to 77 days. It was observed that 
there were three outlier projects in the distribution that had significantly more weather 
delays than the remainder of the projects. This finding disagrees with previous research 
by Assaf & Al-Hejji (2006), who found that most construction professionals believe 
weather is a significant cause of delay. Although it is difficult to draw conclusions from 
insignificant results, this may imply that weather’s environmental influence is diminished 
in a wartime environment because of other environmental factors, such as labor 
availability.  
 There were not any significant results regarding security incidents or any other 
external environmental delays. It is still assumed in this research that these environmental 
issues have a stronger influence on project performance than in peace-time projects. 
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However, this research was unable to yield any significant results to substantiate this 
assumption. It is possible that the effect of these factors is diminished with AFCEC 
projects compared to USACE projects. According to the construction agent, AFCEC 
maintained stricter security and oversight requirements on the part of the contractor 
(Schoenenberger, 2014). This may have reduced the number of incidents that occurred on 
AFCEC projects. To substantiate this, further research should be done on the external 
environment and then compared to different population samples. 
Conclusion & Recommendations 
Initially in this research, it was thought that performance and environmental 
factors would be very predictive of project performance; perhaps even more so than 
project factors. However, project factors tended to be more predictive of budget and 
schedule performance than either of the other two categories. The correlation 
relationships also suggest that project factors and overall performance, are not tied to 
performance factors. Additionally, external environment did not have a significant effect 
on the schedule and budget performance of a project. Analysis of these results brings 
forth several recommendations. 
Minimizing the additional time granted to the contractor may also improve 
schedule performance. The research found that when additional time was granted to the 
contractor by the government, the likelihood of cost growth and schedule growth 
increased.  The construction agent suspects that this may be related to the original period 
of performance that is often assigned to projects in wartime environments. In some cases, 
they believe that not enough time was originally given for contractors to complete their 
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projects. Indeed, this exactly what Russell and Jaselskis (1992) found in their contractor 
evaluation research: failed projects estimated a significantly smaller period of 
performance than successful projects. Additionally, Ibbs (2012) showed that any change 
on a project significantly increases the likelihood of failure. He discovered that changes 
can have an exponential effect on a project and that proper original planning may have 
decreased the overall schedule or budget increases. Therefore, in future contracts it may 
be prudent for construction agents and their owners to consider extending FPOP’s; which 
may reduce overall cost and schedule overruns. 
Additionally, construction agents should ensure a strong financial and historical 
evaluation of all contractors and project managers. As mentioned previously, Russell & 
Jaselskis (1992) found that contract failure could be directly linked to the amount of 
scrutiny that the owner applied to the winning contractor. Moreover, their research 
demonstrated the project manger’s critical role in the success of the project (Russell & 
Jaselskis, 1992), which was reconfirmed by the results of this study: project and contract 
management issues are strongly predictive of poor performance.  
Limitations of the study. 
Unfortunately, the dataset used in this research was too small to perform 
regression analysis or a T-test. However, this fact does not undermine these results. The 
significant of the Fisher’s exact test lies in its conservative nature. Fisher’s test has been 
known to not find significance in cases where a chi-squared test may find significant 
results. While this research would benefit from a larger sample, the results are still 
significant. 
35 
The data was quantitative but derived from qualitative data. The QA engineers 
were solely responsible for citing performance problems, and it is expected that some 
deficiencies or items may have been missed. Additionally, only major deficiencies were 
considered for this study. The data lists many minor deficiencies that were ignored. It 
would be beneficial to analyze this data in future research.   
Future Research. 
As mentioned in the introduction, AFCEC’s project execution methodology is 
significantly different than USACE. Future researchers should consider using USACE 
data for a similar study to compare the results to the AFCEC program. Moreover, 
additional methodology can be used in a USACE study because a large sample size 
should be easy to achieve. 
Labor analysis may play a large role in the slowing of projects, which may be one 
of the reasons why schedule performance was not predicted by weather delays. 
According to the construction agent, many projects experienced slow progress, due to a 
dearth of skilled workers in-country. A fast-moving project that has a plethora of skilled 
laborers on site may be as more affected by poor weather than a project that is already 
progressing slowly. Future research should consider the effect of quality of labor as well 
as the number of workers that are present on-site for the project.  
Similar research should also be applied to other wartime environments. Iraq is a 
viable candidate because it is a recent construction effort and nearly identical in purpose. 
Additionally, both AFCEC and USACE performed work in Iraq, which would allow for 
another comparison between construction agents. 
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Conclusion. 
Much research remains in order to fully understand the difference between 
wartime and peacetime construction projects. The literature review shows that the body 
of knowledge is very small in this industry, yet the monetary expenditure has the 
potential to be great (e.g. Iraq and Afghanistan). Based on this research, there are many 
similarities between wartime and peacetime construction, which should cause 
construction agencies to create more strict policies for contractors, in spite of the 
environment. However, this research covers only a small part of the industry within one 
campaign. Government agencies should increase sponsorships of wartime construction to 
gain additional insight, saving money which could otherwise be used elsewhere. 
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III. Scholarly Article 2: Quantitative Analysis of Construction Contract Type 
Differences in a Wartime Environment 
Ryan M. Hoff; Gregory D. Hammond, Ph.D., P.E.; Peter P. Feng, Ph.D., P.E.; Edward D. 
White, Ph.D 
Abstract 
US-led construction projects in Afghanistan have performed poorly on average; 
indeed, it is the norm to deliver projects late to need and over budget to the customer.  
Using a dataset of 25 Afghan wartime projects, we address the question: How do project 
outcomes differ based on the contract type?  First, with regards to critical success factors, 
current literature suggests that wartime projects may face the same cost and schedule 
factors as peacetime projects, with some notable additions.  Using peacetime factors as a 
baseline, project factors, health and safety compliance, quality of work, technical 
performance, work productivity, and external environmental factors were used as 
dependent variables in a series of Mann-Whitney tests. We found reimbursable contracts 
to have significantly greater cost and schedule growth. Additionally, fixed price projects 
were found to have more problems with design performance and contract management. 
There was no significant difference in overall project quality. In conclusion, cost 
monitoring from the owner and scrutiny of project management is critical to the success 
of reimbursable contracts, and technical performance monitoring is necessary to ensure 
that fixed-price projects meet deadlines. 
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Introduction 
United States inspection reports and its popular press are replete with examples of 
wasteful spending of taxpayer dollars on Afghanistan construction projects (GAO, 2013; 
GAO, 2014; Thibault, 2011; CWC, 2011; Chappell, 2013). As summarized by an 
American official involved in the construction program, “nobody was watching it like 
they should have, and it’s just been an open checkbook.” (Craig, 2013) The Commission 
on Wartime contracting estimated in their 2011 final report that at least $31 billion, but 
possibly as much as $60 billion could be considered “waste” during the lifetime of the 
Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns. (CWC, 2011) With $23 billion being allocated to 
wartime construction efforts as of 2014 (GAO, 2014) construction companies have had 
financial incentives to be involved in the US-led reconstruction effort. Construction waste 
can have many different meanings.  It can mean poorly planned, overseen, or built 
projects; it can be abuse and corruption (SIGAR, 2010). Additionally, it can be the 
construction of unwanted or unneeded facilities or projects delivered over budget and 
behind schedule (Teo & Loosemore, 2001; Sopko, 2013; Thibault, 2011). In this paper, 
we will explore construction waste using the framework of contract types.  Specifically, 
we will determine what construction waste occurs as a result of cost-plus-fixed-fee versus 
fixed-fee contracting. 
The federal acquisition regulations (FAR) describes the process (FAR Part 
16.103, .104) used by the US government to solicit and award contracts.  The two most 
common contract types allowed by the FAR are the firm-fixed price (FFP) contract and 
the cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contract. These two contracts differ vastly in their 
structure and purpose. The FFP contract places the cost and schedule risk on the 
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contractor, while the CPFF contract shifts much of this risk to the US government to 
account for projects with high levels of uncertainty or risk (FAR Part 16.101 b). The 
idiosyncrasies of each contract type have caused contractors to behave differently in their 
interaction with the customer, performance of the project, spending behaviors, schedule 
adherence (Adler & Scherer, 1999). However, no research has been done to show 
differences in contractor behaviors across contract types in a wartime construction 
environment.  
Limited research has been performed on the performance differences between 
fixed price and reimbursable construction projects. Structural differences between fixed 
price and reimbursable contracts have been extensively researched (Nkuah, 2006; Veld & 
A, 1989; Ward & Chapman, 1994; Wamuziri, 2013; Branconi & Loch, 2004) as have the 
types of human behaviors that are inspired by the two contract types (Müller & Turner, 
2005; Osipova, 2014). However, specific causes of contract type performance differences 
are not fully understood (Adler & Scherer, 1999; Jaszkowiak, 2012).  Consequently, 
owners do not fully understand how the selection of a contract type may affect project 
success or conversely induce waste (Veld & A, 1989).  Moreover, this research may be 
particularly relevant to military owners who contract projects in wartime environments. 
While reimbursable contracts may entice companies to submit bids, they also provide 
significant possibility for cost growth and may need to be monitored differently than 
fixed-price contracts. Conversely, fixed price contracts in wartime environments may 
shift so much risk on contractors that it is impossible for companies to make a profit. 
Therefore, this research effort will use data from 25 Afghan wartime construction 
projects to search for factor differences between fixed-price and reimbursable projects 
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that cause waste. The major factors will be project attributes, health and safety, quality, 
technical performance, productivity, and the external environment.  
Literature Review 
US contract and project management personnel who have worked in the 
Afghanistan reconstruction efforts were ill-prepared to manage projects there. Security 
concerns, unqualified personnel, poor planning, improper contract solicitations, poor 
planning, and weak management have all contributed to waste within the US-Afghan 
reconstruction efforts (Thibault, 2011).  To further complicate the challenges faced by the 
owners, the literature suggests that contract type choices will cause contractors to behave 
differently, depending on which contract type is used (Jaszkowiak, 2012; Adler & 
Scherer, 1999). This research investigated these behaviors so that construction 
professionals can have clearer expectations for contract performance in future wartime 
projects in order to minimize waste. 
The contract types used in this wartime construction projects study are firm-fixed 
price (FFP) and cost-plus fixed fee (CPFF). In FFP contracts, the key component is 
referred as the pre-calculation, in which the contractor and the client negotiate a dollar 
amount separate from the actual costs of the project. The contractor shoulders the 
majority of the risk in this case, and the client knows in advance how much will be paid 
to the contractor. The owner’s risk is limited to design or specification errors (United 
States v. Spearin, 1918). Furthermore, the contractor’s risk is based on its ability to 
provide an accurate estimate that will adequately cover its costs, yield a small profit, and 
qualify as the lowest, but most technically acceptable, bid (Smith, Currie & Hancock, 
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2009). A cost-plus contract is a “cost reimbursable” contract, which require the client to 
reimburse the contractor for the ultimate costs of the project irrespective of initial 
estimates. In the case of a CPFF project, the contractor is also paid a fixed and pre-
negotiated fee for their services. (Veld & A, 1989; Ward & Chapman, 1994). Thus, the 
owner assumes risks not only for the design but also for increases in material and labor 
costs.  In contrast, the contractor assumes little risk as the owner underwrites the project 
(Nkuah, 2006). 
For all federal projects, the project contracting officer is the ultimate decision-
maker for which contract type used for a contract (FAR Part 16.1). Many factors must be 
considered when choosing a contract method such as price competition, price analysis, 
cost analysis, type and complexity of the project, urgency of the project, and performance 
period of the contract (FAR part 16.1). Certain levels of uncertainty are tolerable for a 
fixed-price contract, but the market typically will not accept high levels of uncertainty 
without adequate compensation. Therefore, with high levels of risk, it behooves the 
owner to assume that risk and use reimbursable contract in order to save money and time 
(Nkuah, 2006).  Historically, reimbursable contracts are generally not used, in larger 
development projects due to the risk of substantial cost overruns; as is common in 
construction projects (Veld & A, 1989).  According to the FAR, the selected contract 
type should maximize the value to the government. 
Contract type also influences project performance.  Adler & Sherer (1999) used a 
multi-variate methodology with transaction cost analysis (TCA) to evaluate differences 
between reimbursable, fixed-price, and incentive contracts in the defense aerospace 
industry (Adler & Scherer, 1999). TCA is the theory that the management of the contract 
42 
is based on several factors: asset specificity, uncertainty, bounded rationality, and 
opportunism present in the contract. It also proposes that contracts show differing 
amounts of control, coordination, and adaption (Williamson, 1998). The study found 
reimbursable projects performed better when the contractor contributes more knowledge 
to complete the transaction, but fixed-price contracts are more useful for purchasing 
projects that have well-defined requirements (Adler & Scherer, 1999).  Thus, ill-defined 
projects, with accompanying higher levels of contractor risk, have better outcomes when 
coupled with reimbursable projects and well-defined requirements are better suited to 
fixed-price contracts.  Likewise, Müller and Turner (2005) found fixed-price contracts 
cause owners to abdicate their project responsibilities to the contractor causing an 
increased likelihood of an adverse outcome.  Additionally, they found that reimbursable 
contracts encourage contractors to ignore project objectives as they focus on possible 
financial gains also threatening project success.  
Contract type is commonly promoted as a method for the owner to manage 
project risk. Braconi and Loch (2004) developed a framework of eight key business 
drivers and determined how fixed price, incentive, and reimbursable projects interact 
with the primary factors. They found that fixed price contract demand very well-defined 
project attributes (e.g. scope, design, estimates), but require significantly less effort from 
owners to ensure that contractors stay within budget and schedule limitations. 
Conversely, reimbursable projects are well-suited for ill-defined scopes but require heavy 
involvement from the owner to control costs. Incentive based contracts often provide a 
healthy balance of risk to both parties but are often difficult to negotiate. They propose 
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that fixed contracts can be written so as to reduce the risk in areas of uncertainty, thereby 
protecting both the owner and the contractor.  
Therefore, selection of a contract type may be crucial to the business success of 
an owner. Veld and Peters (1989) developed a decision network by which owners can 
select a contract type, based on an owner’s assessment of the contractor’s competency 
and ability to manage six criteria: cost uncertainty, technical uncertainty, available extra 
resources, schedule criticality, performance criticality, and long-term motives. They 
propose that firm-fixed price contracts are never acceptable with a high cost or technical 
uncertainty. However, they consider high-uncertainty in the other factors to be acceptable 
for fixed-price projects. They make note that military and government agencies rarely use 
incentive methods. Ultimately, their recommendation is for project owners to consider 
the use of incentive contracts.  
Wamuziri (2013) reached the same conclusion as Veld and Peters (1989) 
regarding incentive contracts in his study that focused on collaborate procurement for 
infrastructure projects. He found that premiums for fixed-price contracts tend to be quite 
high, due to the high risk born by the contractor. In opposition, reimbursable contracts, 
“[arguably] have reverse incentives for the contractor to drive the costs upwards.” 
(Wamuziri, 2013) In order to inspire lower premiums and better technical performance 
(both which lower the risk to the owner) it is desirable to increase the number of bidders 
for a construction project. But incentive contracts have been shown to provide a healthy 
balance of risk between the contractor and the owner, fostering a joint-effort environment 
as opposed to high scrutiny and wariness (Berends, 2000). 
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Previously, it has been thought that contract type has a significant effect on bid 
competition and contractor competency; however previous research has shown that it is 
the contract size and scope that is primary predictor of competitiveness, and that perhaps 
the contract type is a sub-factor for (Drew & Skitmore, 1997). Indeed, some research 
argues that the uncertainty of the project scope and size should be the primary 
determinant of contract type, and other risks are considered more tertiary. As previously 
discussed, the business culture and relationships between the owner and the contractor 
may be a large predictor of the ultimate success of a project, regardless of contract type 
(Turner & Simister, 2001). 
Despite this research, to-date, significant performance differences between fixed-
price and reimbursable projects in a wartime environment have not been researched. 
There are many performance factors that can be analyzed. For example, Adler (1999) 
found that, in the aerospace acquisition industry, a fixed-price project may not require as 
robust of a design effort as a reimbursable project, because project complexity should be 
lower for a fixed-price versus a reimbursable. If this is the case, then fixed-price projects 
may not experience as many instances of design rework as reimbursable projects. 
Jaszkowiak (2012) was able to analyze contract performance metrics (e.g. cost and 
schedule perfect performance), but did not have data to analyze performance or 
management factors. This research will analyze performance factors as well as cost and 
schedule factors. 
It is hypothesized that contract type affects project success and waste; the factors 
to be tested were determined by reviewing the literature on key performance indicators.  
Wartime projects likely face the same delay causes as peacetime projects with some 
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notable additions. Only one qualitative study has been performed in Afghanistan 
regarding project challenges; many of its observed causes of delay are common in other 
nearby Asian and African countries. Delays are caused by design problems, planning 
problems, weather interference, unskilled workers/quality problems, and difficulty 
working with the owner or lack of direction from the owner, and change orders or scope 
changes (Affleck, et al., 2011; Assaf & Al-Hejji, 2006; Mansfield, et al., 1994; Marzouk 
& El-Rasas, 2014; Olima & K'akumu, 1999).  
The Afghanistan study found that, overwhelmingly, security concerns were the 
primary challenge to projects. This factor is generally unique to wartime projects. While 
the FAR defines delays due to acts of terror as excusable but noncompensable, the data 
for this study showed that attacks were often treated as a compensable delay. The 
frequency of security problems in Afghanistan is much higher than those experienced in 
peacetime construction.    
The physical environment of the project is commonly mentioned in both wartime 
and peacetime literature. Weather conditions are one of the most commonly cited delay 
factors for all projects. Afghanistan has the potential for particularly harsh weather, 
especially in the mountainous regions. Affleck, et al. (2010) stated that planning for harsh 
weather was particularly poor in Afghanistan. Other industry literature does not discuss 
planning but does consistently cite it as a cause for delay. Most construction contracts 
allow for a certain number of weather delay days, but also state that is considered an 
excusable delay, offering no compensation except in extreme cases (Smith, Currie & 
Hancock, 2009). 
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Key performance indicators (KPI) were also used as input factors to analyze 
differences between contracts. Chan, et al. (2002) performed a meta-analysis of KPIs, as 
determined by construction researchers. They found that the most predictive performance 
metrics were, predictably, time and cost. Other factors are project safety and financial 
performance of the contractor. The largest qualitative predictors were construction 
quality and customer satisfaction. A follow-up study by Chan, et al (2004) developed a 
framework for project success and identified five categories of factors: project 
management actions, project procedures, external environment, human-related factors 
(often unpredictable or immeasurable), and project-related factors (e.g. type, size, number 
of floors).  
Currently, there exists a large amount of research that predicts construction 
delays; however, very little analysis has been done to investigate performance differences 
between reimbursable and fixed-price contracts. This research will use the collection of 
the reviewed delay factors to test the differences between contract types and see if there 
are significant differences in waste, which may allow construction agents to oversee 
projects better. 
Methodology 
In order to understand how contract types affect waste in wartime construction 
projects, the Mann-Whitney median comparison test will be used to test differences 
among the mean for the for project factors, performance factors, and environmental 
factors (See Table 10).  The project factors are basic metadata with regard to each 
project, such as award, contract length, and the number of contract modifications. 
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Performance factors are related to major construction, design, and material quality 
control deficiencies cited by the quality assurance engineer. Additionally, it includes 
worker health and safety compliance. Environmental factors are related to all external 
environmental factors which are outside the control of the contractor. Weather, 
interference from locals, and security threats are examples of the external environment. 
All these potential sources of waste were analyzed to determine if firm-fixed price or cost 
reimbursable contracts caused more project waste.   
The response variables were obtained from an analysis of the each project’s daily 
reports, created by the US government’s quality assurance engineer.  Twenty-five 
projects were analyzed; 11 were FFP and 14 were CPFF. Each report contained 
comments regarding construction quality (positive and negative) as well as daily 
construction activities (e.g. quality deficiencies, mock-up meetings, progress for each 
craft). They also documented delays, security incidents, safety mishaps or deficiencies. 
The average award cost was $25.5 million, and the average final cost of the projects was 
$33.2 million. The majority of the projects focused on vertical construction. Table 11 
provides summary data regarding the projects.   
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Table 10 - Analysis Factors 
Project Factors 
Award Amount 
Final Cost 
Awarded Cost Growth (Index) 
Number of Contract Modifications 
Number of Change Orders (Scope Changes) 
Number of FPOP extensions 
Total days added to the contract 
Initial Period of Performance 
Initial Period of Performance 
Final Period of Performance 
Awarded Schedule Growth (Index) 
 
Performance Factors 
Quality Factors 
Horizontal work (Concrete and/or Asphalt) 
Building Foundation (Concrete/Rebar/Soils) 
Electrical (High and Low Voltage, Comm Lines/Outlets) 
Mechanical (HVAC, Gas, Boilers) 
Utility (Water, Sewer, and Storm) 
Structural (Masonry, Steel, and Wood) 
Interior Finishing (Doors, Tiles, Walls, Ceilings, Bathroom Fixtures, Paint) 
Exterior finishing (Windows, Exterior doors, Garage Doors, Fences) 
Technical Performance Factors 
Design Performance 
Material/Submittals 
Health and Safety 
Safety Incidents and/or Deficiencies 
 
External Environmental Factors 
Region of Afghanistan 
Security Incidents 
Other External Environment Issues 
Weather 
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The daily quality reports were coded by type of factor (i.e., Table 10) yielding the 
independent variables for this study. When an occurrence of a factor was encountered in 
the review of the daily reports, the incident was recorded. Each occurrence was 
independently linked to the project and all of the meta-data associated with that project. 
This allowed for a summary coding for each project, which then allowed for 
differentiation between projects, based on contract type.  
Table 11 - Project Data 
Project Information Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Award Amount $25.5 M $17.0 M $21.4 M 
Final Cost $33.2 M $23.9 M $28.7 M 
Number of Contract Modifications 8.73 7 3.94 
Change Orders (Scope Changes) 2.93 2 2.40 
Initial Period of Performance (days) 382.76 365 144.82 
Final Period of Performance (days) 822.84 741 353.70 
 
Weather was the most commonly reported external environment issue, followed 
by security incidents, and then any other external environmental issue, which ranged 
from locals and the Afghan National Army interfering with the project, to a swine flu 
outbreak halting progress on several projects for multiple days. Most projects had fewer 
than 40 days of weather delays. The maximum number of delays days due to security was 
18. However, the majority of the projects had fewer than 6 days cited. A summary is 
shown in Table 12. 
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Table 12 – External Environmental 
Factor Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Security Incidents (days lost) 5.32 3 6.08 
Other external environmental issues (days lost) 6.60 1 11.70 
Weather (days lost) 20.32 12 21.95 
 
There was also significant variance in the number of performance deficiencies 
noted between the projects. The most common performance problems were with the 
design and material submittals of the project. There were no recorded incidents of poor 
engineering, which led to a failure. However, as the government had a thorough review 
process, the most commonly observed problem was contractors submitting finalized 
designs that did not address all the review comments, causing many unnecessary 
review/resubmit cycles. The majority of projects had between 0 and 15 design 
performance incidents, and one project had 31. For material and submittal deficiencies, 
contractors were often late in submitting material submittals, and they also commonly 
ordered materials that did not coincide with the original submittal. However, most 
projects maintained an incident rate of 5 or less, with three projects being above that, and 
one as high as 24. The material submittal incidents were slightly more distributed (90% 
between 0 and 20), and the highest count was 28 incidents.   
Of the eight quality factors, four had significant variance.  The most common 
quality problem was electrical work (M=4.0, SD = 6.72) (both high and low voltage). 
The project with the most electrical problems had 28 recorded incidents.   Structural 
issues were reported second most commonly (M=3.0, SD = 4.85), the projects with the 
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most structural issues had respectively 14 and 20 incidents. Most projects did not have 
many foundation problems (M = 2.7, SD = 5.8) but two projects had 12 and 28 each.  
Lastly, utility issues (M = 1.7, SD = 2.72) had two outliers with 8 and 11 incidents.  A 
summary of project performance is provided in Table 13.  
Table 13 - Project Deficiency Summary 
Deficiencies (No. of occurrences) Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Project Management 1.37 0 2.06 
Contract Management 1.70 0 2.75 
Design Performance 6.52 5 6.51 
Material & Submittals 4.07 2 4.95 
Safety Deficiencies 2.56 1 5.22 
Reportable Safety Incidents 0.76 0 1.33 
Horizontal work  0.78 0 1.90 
Building Foundation  2.70 1 5.77 
Electrical  4.00 1 6.72 
Mechanical  0.52 0 0.90 
Utility 1.74 1 2.72 
Structural 3.00 1 4.85 
Interior Finishing 0.85 0 1.37 
Exterior finishing 0.48 0 0.56 
 
The research will use the Mann-Whitney test to evaluate dependencies and 
differences in the analysis factors between contract types. The Mann-Whitney test is an 
appropriate choice for use of small-sample, non-parametric comparison between the 
medians of two different populations because it does not rely on data distribution. Rather, 
it uses a median ranking comparisons of each data-point to determine a sum-rank score, 
which is then converted to a hypothesis test statistic and used in a standard z-test. (Gold, 
2007). Ultimately, the hypothesis test will determine if the median is statistically different 
between contract types and can determine if there is a significant difference in the amount 
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of waste as measured by the average performance of a FFP contract over a CPFF in a 
continuous variable, such as schedule or cost performance.  
Results  
The study used the Mann-Whitney pairwise comparison test with a 2-sided, 
normal approximation to test the hypothesized factors. The results, shown in Table 14, 
indicate that there are five significant factors and one near significant factor that 
displayed differences across contract types.  The “U” value is the rank assigned to the 
variable; the “z” is the test statistic value and the “Sig. (2-tailed)” is the p-value for the 
test. Factors were determined to be significant if they possessed a p-value of 0.05 or less. 
The final cost, awarded cost growth, final period of performance, design performance, 
and contract management were significant as a result of contract type. 
In the daily reports, a project management deficiency was anything associated 
with the poor planning or management of the work on-site. For example, oftentimes the 
contractor would proceed with the work without coordinating with the QA engineer, 
performing proper inspections beforehand, or developing and publishing a QC plan. 
Another example is scheduling conflicting craft disciplines in the same work area, 
resulting in delays and worker conflicts.  
Contract management items were primarily issues where the contractor failed to 
meet contractual requirements. Examples are a contractor’s failure to submit an updated 
schedule, master plan, utility plan, progress and status updates. Another common 
infraction was providing proper living and working conditions for the QA engineer(s).  
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We took great care to ensure that design performance was defined so that these 
issues did not overlap with project or contract management. Therefore, these issues only 
included design quality and design schedule performance. Although the construction 
agent has now since identified several design flaws post-contract completion, there were 
no recorded occurrences of construction failure as a result of poor design. Late design 
submissions were the primary problem. As a result, the contractor often worked at risk 
(working at risk was not coded independently, because it was nearly always caused by 
late design). 
The awarded schedule growth index was calculated by dividing the final 
government-allowed period of performance by initial contractual period of performance. 
This is not necessarily the actual performance period. The actual period of performance 
could not be used to calculate a schedule growth factor because of the inherent 
differences between fixed-price and reimbursable contracts. Fixed price projects are 
contractually able to continue in operation after the contractual completion date has 
expired. This is because the risk is placed on the contractor. However, reimbursable 
contracts must be closed out when the period of performance expires unless the owner 
extends the contractual completion date. Therefore, in a reimbursable contract, the actual 
completion date is always the same or before the contractual date. This makes actual 
completion dates incomparable between the contract types, which is why the contractual 
completion date was chosen for both projects. Moreover, the contractual completion date 
is within the control of the owner (whereas actual completion in fixed contracts is not), 
and is thereby a superior factor to compare between the two contract types. 
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Table 14 –Mann-Whitney test for contract types 
Factor Type Mean Standard Deviation S Z Prob>|Z| 
Award Amount CPFF $25.6  
$17.6 M 125 -0.96   0.338 FFP $25.3 
 
$26.4 M 
Final Cost CPFF $37.5  
$28.6 M 105 -2.05   0.040* FFP $27.7 
 
$29.1 M 
Awarded Cost Growth CPFF 1.48 0.38 98 -2.44   0.015* FFP 1.13 0.17 
Number of Contract 
Modifications 
CPFF 10.1 4.8 124 -1.02   0.308 FFP 7.4 1.8 
Change Orders CPFF 3.4 2.8 120 -1.26   0.208 FFP 2.1 1.4 
Number of FPOP extensions CPFF 5.4 2.4 103.5 -2.17   0.030* FFP 3.3 1.3 
Total Days Added to 
Contract 
CPFF 591 275 97 -2.49   0.013* FFP 330 151 
Initial Period of Performance CPFF 390 145 138.5 -0.22   0.827 FFP 373 145 
Final Period of Performance CPFF 945 400 105 -2.05   0.040* FFP 668 209 
Awarded Schedule Growth CPFF 2.46 0.77 107 -1.94   0.0521 FFP 1.86 0.61 
Security Incidents CPFF 4.1 4.5 157 0.74   0.457 FFP 6.9 7.3 
Other external 
environmental issue 
CPFF 5.4 8.9 151.5 0.45   0.653 FFP 8.2 14.4 
Weather CPFF 22.9 22.4 126.5 -0.88   0.380 FFP 17.1 21.3 
Project Management CPFF 1.3 2.1 154 0.63   0.526 FFP 1.6 2.2 
Contract Management CPFF 1.2 2.8 180.5 2.15   0.031* FFP 2.6 2.7 
Design Performance CPFF 3.9 2.7 187 2.39   0.017* FFP 10.1 8.2 
Material & Submittals CPFF 6.1 8.5 119 -1.32   0.186 FFP 2.3 3.7 
Safety Deficiencies CPFF 1.9 3.4 157.5 0.80   0.425 FFP 3.9 7.0 
Reportable Safety Incidents CPFF 0.7 1.0 135 -0.48   0.631 FFP 0.8 1.7 
Horizontal work  CPFF 0.6 0.9 140 -0.17   0.868 FFP 1.2 2.8 
Building Foundation  CPFF 2.1 3.2 151.5 0.45   0.652 FFP 4.0 8.1 
Electrical  CPFF 3.4 4.6 132.5 -0.58   0.561 FFP 5.0 9.1 
Mechanical  CPFF 0.5 1.2 152.5 0.62   0.531 FFP 0.6 1.2 
Utility  CPFF 1.7 2.9 150 0.37   0.709 
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Factor Type Mean Standard Deviation S Z Prob>|Z| 
FFP 2.1 2.6 
Structural  CPFF 3.2 5.3 149.5 0.33   0.738 FFP 3.4 4.5 
Interior Finishing CPFF 0.6 1.0 156 0.77   0.438 FFP 1.3 1.7 
Exterior finishing CPFF 0.6 1.2 151 0.48   0.628 FFP 0.5 0.5 
*Signifies 2-tailed significance (p < 0.05). Reject null hypothesis. 
1Nearly significant; and is significant using Fisher’s Exact Test in a contingency table. 
 
The awarded schedule growth was a near-significant factor in the Mann-Whitney 
test. Therefore, further investigation was appropriate. A contingency table using Fisher’s 
exact test revealed that awarded schedule growth was dependent on contract-type (p = 
0.0154).  
Discussion of Results 
Cost. 
Reimbursable contracts were found to have significantly higher costs than fixed 
price contracts.  This difference was found for cost increases during the life of the project 
and for the final project cost.  Notably, there was not a significant difference between 
award amounts of contract types. These findings demonstrate that reimbursable contracts 
are likely to be awarded at similar prices to firm-fixed price contracts, but are likely to 
cost more at the end of the project.  The validity of this conclusion is strengthened by the 
significant difference seen in cost growth.  In the analysis, large projects were compared 
alongside small projects; and there may have been considerable variance between the 
project factors, which may reduce the credibility of a direct comparison in terms of raw 
cost or some other attribute.  The cost growth index normalizes the projects’ cost 
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comparisons.  For example, larger projects may have differences in risk and nature of 
work than smaller projects. Additionally, when a larger project experiences delay, it 
ought to cost more money to make up the time deficit. The cost growth index removes 
unique assignments of cost to enable comparisons. When this was done, we found that 
the ratio between final and initial costs is significantly higher for reimbursable contracts 
versus fixed price contracts. Higher cost growth in reimbursable contracts aligns with 
other industry research. Reimbursable contracts do not incentivize cost-control (Nkuah, 
2006); rather they may incentivize cost growth (Wamuziri, 2013).  
Schedule. 
The average time required to complete a reimbursable project is greater than the 
time for a fixed-price project. This finding confirms Jaszkowiak’s (2012) finding for 
other Afghan and Iraq US military construction projects.   The observed schedule growth 
is expected because structurally, schedule and cost growth are strongly linked in 
reimbursable contracts.  By law, schedules extensions are accompanied by an increase in 
funding (GSA, 1984).  Based on this structural connection, we would expect contract 
modifications to be a mediating variable.  Indeed, previous research has shown that 
contract changes are closely related to schedule performance in projects (Ibbs, 2012). 
While total number of scope modifications was not different between the contract types, 
reimbursable contracts had more schedule modifications than fixed contracts. 
Additionally, the number of days added to the contract was also higher for reimbursable 
contracts. Therefore, the results suggest that, rather than scope changes being the cause of 
schedule extensions, as Ibbs (2012) suggested, it may be some other mediating factor, or 
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possibly the contractor’s lack of incentive to adhere to the schedule that begets more time 
extensions in reimbursable contracts. 
 Contract types also had a near-significantly p-value for differences in the awarded 
schedule growth index. The p-value was so close to 0.05 (unlike any other factor) that 
additional analysis was performed for the factor. A contingency table showed that 
schedule growth could be dependent on contract type. Reimbursable contracts had higher 
schedule growth than fixed contracts. This reflects similar behavior as discussed with 
final costs: contractors for reimbursable contracts may not be motivated to control 
schedule growth (Nkuah, 2006). FFP contractors are incentivized to minimize 
construction costs and schedule, which involves indirect costs as the project is delayed. 
CPFF contractors do not have these inhibitions for either cost or schedule. The 
construction agent reported that contractors would often divide their original bid by the 
number of days in the period of performance to establish a daily burn rate. Oftentimes, 
the daily burn rate was maintained or exceeded. But just as often, the planned schedule 
was not met, and the allocated funds were exhausted before the project was complete. 
Therefore, when more time was granted to the project, additional funding had to be 
granted to complete the same project (Schoenenberger, 2014). By design, CPFF projects 
have greater potential for schedule growth, and this research found that for this sample, 
on average they did exhibit more schedule growth. 
Performance. 
Fixed-price contracts underperformed compared to reimbursable contracts in 
design performance and the contract management of the project. The daily reports 
indicated that the majority of the reported design deficiencies were due to incomplete 
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design submissions to the government. The incomplete designs created a 
rework/resubmission cycle. The contractors would choose to work at risk on the projects 
(sometimes for months) beginning construction without final, approved designs in order 
to meet contractual performance obligations. Similarly, the contractors frequently worked 
at risk as they tried to comply with contract management tasks. Contractors would miss 
submission deadlines and would have difficulty correcting the deficiency.  However, the 
daily reports did not indicate that project quality was directly affected as a result of 
contractors working at risk. Acceptable designs or contract submissions were eventually 
submitted. The tests suggest that contractors did not pay as close attention to contract and 
design documents on fixed price contracts. It is interesting that projects were able to 
continue successfully in spite of severely late design submissions and approvals. This 
may confirm previous research suggesting there are unnecessary steps in the government 
design-review process, or that some details of design are not critical to project completion 
and simpler criteria may still yield a successful project (Blomberg, et al., 2014). 
Mentionable lack of results. 
 This study did not find a significant difference in quality performance between the 
two contract types. This contrasts with Jaszkowiak’s (2012) work.  Her survey of 
construction professionals found that a reimbursable project tended to yield better-quality 
projects. This research did not find any craftsmanship quality differences between fixed 
price and reimbursable projects. These conflicting results may be attributable to the 
source of data. Jaszkowiak assessed overall perceptions from the government 
construction management teams whereas this study’s data consists of QA deficiency 
reports. This research did not analyze customer satisfaction of the project, which is a 
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large factor in determining the final quality of a project (Baccarini, 1999; Lim & 
Mohamed, 1999). Notwithstanding, this research suggests that heightened deficiencies or 
poor quality work should not be a unique subject of focus for either contract type. 
Reimbursable contracts are used in Afghanistan by the US government because of 
the increased risk due to the security situation.  As a result, it was expected that external 
environmental factors would be more prevalent on reimbursable contracts. The use of this 
contract type is justified because of the more austere or uncertain project environments.  
However, there was no significant difference in delays due to any of the external 
environmental factors. In fact, security incidents and other external environmental delays 
(e.g. local interference) were reported more often in fixed-price contracts, though not 
significantly. This result may suggest that risk assessments may not adequately assess the 
security situation for both reimbursable and fixed-price projects. Additionally, the term 
“high-risk” has a broad meaning. A project may have been high-risk simply due to being 
in a remote location or due to the security situation. Additionally, some accessible 
projects are classified as high-risk because of the undefined scope, or anticipation of 
many change orders as the end-user firmed up requirements (Schoenenberger, 2014). As 
the external environment was not a significant factor between contract types, these 
findings may also suggest that the high-risk projects are characterized more by vague 
project requirements than the environment. 
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Conclusion and Recommendations 
Recommendation 1 – Find source of rework in Design Process.  
As described in the discussion, the “failures” that most occurred with design 
performance and contract management were wasteful rework and missed deadlines.  
Previous research has shown that design rework problems can have a significant effect on 
the overall schedule of construction projects (Li & Taylor, 2014). Furthermore, 
Blomberg, et al. (2014) performed a case study on two near-identical projects to show 
that internal policies and procedures can be a significant cause of cost increases. Other 
research has shown that, in some cases, design review systems are often plagued by 
inefficient processes. However, oftentimes the realignment of tasks and priorities 
increases efficiency (Palaneeswaran, et al., 2014). Aside from being more aware of 
possible design performance problems in fixed-price contracts, it may help construction 
agents to perform lean analysis, or some kind of similar process improvement, of their 
audit systems to ensure that inefficient reviewing or unnecessary requirements are not the 
root-cause of rework for contract submittals. 
Recommendation 2 – Scrutinize Tasks & Productivity in Reimbursable Projects. 
For cost reimbursable projects, two metrics are critical to maintaining the 
schedule: a progress measurement system and a productivity index (Nkuah, 2006). In 
fixed-price contracts, individual line-items are not important to auditing the project. 
However, in reimbursable projects, the ultimate cost of the project is a sum of all 
individual costs – all of which require approval and review. Any task that finishes late 
will require additional labor (and possibly material) than originally planned will, as a 
result, increase the cost of the project. In order to minimize risk to the owner and remain 
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informed of the exact progress of the project, construction agents should consider using a 
system that measures incremental task progress and aids in the detailed inspection of 
small line-items (Nkuah, 2006). 
Quality assurance engineers should also have the ability to measure the labor 
productivity for all project teams.  After all, “the craft labor force is the major element 
that affects the cost and schedule of a cost reimbursable project.” (Nkuah, 2006) The 
primary metric for this is the productivity index, which is a ratio of the actual hours and 
the planned hours. There are specific methods by which a QA engineer may assess the 
productivity index for a contractor, and compare the metric to the original plan. When the 
index is above one, then the project costs are greater than the planned amounts. This 
helps the construction agent to forecast progress, as well as identify areas of the project to 
scrutinize and address with the contractor. Finally, to ease the process and reduce labor of 
inspection, the recommendation is to make the audit system simple and easy to 
understand and implement (Nkuah, 2006). 
A much more common method of measuring progress is by using earned value 
forecasting. These methods have been shown to be applicable in post-project tracking. 
Wauters and Vanhoucke (2014) used a Monte Carlo simulation to forecast cost and 
schedule performance with the cost performance index (CPI) and schedule performance 
(SPI) index. Additionally, Kim and Reinschmidt (2011) developed a Bayesian framework 
which used historical SPI and CPI data to forecast project cost and schedule performance. 
Implementation of these methods may help construction agents accurately track and 
control cost and schedule growth before it reaches an unredeemable level. 
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Recommendation 3 – Consider all contract types to minimize costs to owner. 
 In a wartime construction environment, risk is a significant factor of concern for 
both construction agents and firms. Previous research has already shown that the 
perception of risk significantly affects both bidding behaviors and also ultimate behavior 
of the contractor in response to significant changes in costs of completing the 
requirements of the contract (Baron, 1972). In wartime environments, it is logical for a 
construction agent to employ reimbursable contracts because of the low-risk the 
contractor carries. According to Baron‘s results, reducing risk to contractors ought to 
inspire motivation to bid, which increases the likelihood of a construction agent 
accomplishing its mission. The increased risk in wartime environments demands a more 
conservative construction model and an increase in flexibility. Reimbursable contracts 
possess both of these attributes. 
However, it may behoove wartime construction agents to consider other 
construction models in order to minimize costs and waste to government. One uncommon 
option for government construction is the incentive-based contract. Fixed price and 
reimbursable incentive contracts are increasing in popularity in the private sector because 
they are designed to reward good performance and penalize poor performance. No 
additional action is required on the part of the owner (Veld & A, 1989). Previous research 
has shown that contract type is not the only predictor of whether or not a contractor will 
accept project risk. Price is also a factor. Previous research has used utility theory and 
decision analysis to find breakpoints, for different levels of risk, where a contractor will 
accept lump-sum prices over a cost-plus contract (Carr, 1977). Applying this model to 
government contracts, or performing updated analysis in future research, may assist 
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construction agents in selecting the most advantageous contract type in order to balance 
the risk, cost, and schedule. Therefore, there are root causes and reasons that may lead to 
the predictive factors. While the significant problems are indeed predictive, they may 
only be symptoms of greater problems with the two contract types.  
Limitations. 
This study was limited to 25 projects, which limited the type of statistical tests 
that could be used to perform analysis.  Only non-parametric tests could be used, and 
only those that are known to be compatible with small-sample size populations. Future 
research should obtain a larger sample group (perhaps from USACE) which will increase 
the number of analysis options. Another limitation was the depth of data retrieval from 
the daily reports. The combined length of the daily reports was approximately 20,000 
pages. Therefore, only major deficiencies were analyzed. However, there were many 
other minor incidents recorded by the QA engineers. In-depth case study research on 
smaller groups of these projects may provide further insight into performance differences 
between contracts. 
Concluding thoughts. 
The purpose of this research is to provide construction agents, firms, and military 
leaders alike with information that will help curb waste and aid strategic decisions 
regarding future military construction and nation-building projects.  All of these facts 
underline the rapidly changing environment that is wartime construction, which has a 
significant effect on the progress of a project. While the results imply that cost growth 
and schedule growth seen in reimbursable contracts is greater than those of fixed-price 
contracts, it would be irresponsible to assume that FFP contracts are more advantageous 
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for the government to use in a wartime environment. There were specific reasons, usually 
risk-oriented, that led the construction agent to use CPFF contracts, especially in the 
initial stages of the Afghanistan reconstruction. Arguably, the use of CPFF may have 
prevented default of contractors on more high-risk projects. Instead, the moral of this 
paper is that owners need to be aware that reimbursable objects are likely to have more 
cost and schedule growth.  Owners and their agents need to take decisive steps as 
described in the recommendations to minimize the growth and to reduce the overall 
amount of waste.   
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IV. Discussion 
Chapter Overview 
 This chapter contains additional content relevant to the thesis topic, but 
inappropriate for inclusion in the scholarly articles. The material on the methodology 
contains background on contingency tables and their operation which may be helpful to 
follow-on students. The further discussion contains more in-depth discussion on the 
results of Kendall’s correlation test for scholarly Article 1. This information is most 
relevant to the sponsor, but may also be useful for other students who are looking 
establish discrete probability values for decision analysis use.  
Methodology 
The contingency tables will serve to answer the question of independence for cost 
or schedule. Restated, the research question essentially asks, “Which are the factors – if 
any – upon which cost and schedule are dependent?” Contingency tables use categorical 
variables to sort occurrences of incidents, and then create marginal probabilities 
(McClave, et al., 2011).  
The input factors to be observed in the projects are considered categorical. 
(Example: Concrete Quality Problems present versus not present.)  The response variable 
is ultimate schedule performance or cost performance (expressed as a “1” for positive 
performance, and “0” for negative performance), which has already been divided into 
qualitative categories. The response variable is the separation between FFP or CPFF 
projects. A two-way contingency table will be created using every input variable from 
Table 2. An example is shown in Table 16. Additionally, once the data is split in this 
66 
way, a probability table will be developed, which will look similar to Table 16, except it 
will contain probabilities that are calculated by dividing the original values by the total 
number of data points.  
Table 15 – Contingency Table Example 
 Response A Response B Totals 
Input A n11 n12 R1 
Input B n21 n22 R2 
Totals Cc1 Cc2 n 
 
There are some basic requirements which must be met in order for the 
contingency table to be used. The projects are independent in nature, have k possible 
outcomes (or categories), and the probabilities of all k outcomes will subsequently add to 
1. Contingency tables also require each cell to have a large sample size, which is n=5 
(McClave, et al., 2011). The dataset meets this requirement for the given inputs. The 
dataset is representative of the entire population of projects for the program being 
researched. Therefore a random sample is not necessary. The data meet the requirements 
to perform a multinomial contingency table experiment. 
 The experiment involves two different kinds of hypothesis test: the Chi-square 
test and Fisher’s Exact Test. The Chi-square test is for when all cells are greater than 5 in 
a 2x2 contingency table. The initial hypothesis will be there that projects which were 
behind or ahead of schedule are independent of a given input. The test is performed using 
the Χ2 test statistic. To find this value, the probabilities which correspond to the original 
table are used to calculate an expected value for each cell, which are in turn used to 
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calculate Χ2. After comparing the test statistic to the value of Χ2.05 we will determine 
independence or dependence on the input attribute. 
 This thesis exclusively used Fisher’s exact test because all of the tables had at 
least one cell which did not satisfy the n = 5 condition. The initial and alternative 
hypothesis are the same for Fisher’s test as the Chi-Square test. The primary difference is 
that Fisher’s exact test uses a hypergeometric-binomial combined distribution. The test is 
an iterative method, which manipulates the given table from one extreme possibility to 
another and results in a cumulative probability value (see Equation 1) which predicts the 
likelihood of the contingency table distribution occurring comparing to other possible 
combinations which could come from the sample population. Much like a normal p-value 
calculation, the null hypothesis is rejected when the probability value is below 5%, 
indicating dependence. 
Equation 1 – Fisher's Exact Test 
𝒑 =
�𝒏𝟏𝟏+𝒏𝟏𝟐𝒏𝟏𝟏 � �
𝒏𝟐𝟏+𝒏𝟐𝟐
𝒏𝟐𝟏
�
� 𝒏𝒏𝟏𝟏+𝒏𝟐𝟏�
=
(𝒏𝟏𝟏 + 𝒏𝟏𝟐)! (𝒏𝟐𝟏 + 𝒏𝟐𝟐)! (𝒏𝟏𝟏 + 𝒏𝟐𝟏)! (𝒏𝟏𝟐 + 𝒏𝟐𝟐)!
𝒏𝟏𝟏! ∗ 𝒏𝟏𝟐! ∗ 𝒏𝟐𝟏! ∗ 𝒏𝟐𝟐! ∗ 𝒏!
 
For the second article, the Mann-Whitney test used to compare performance 
differences between reimbursable and fixed-price contracts (although one contingency 
table comparison was used). This test was employed because it is known for being more 
accurate when used in non-parametric situations (i.e. when distributions are not normally 
distributed). Different than an f-test it employs a ranking system by comparing each point 
of one dataset and observing how many points of the comparison population are below it. 
A score is assigned to that data point. The sum of all of the score is the rank for that 
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category. A test statistic is then calculated using the rank, the mean rank of that variable, 
and the standard distribution of the individual rankings. This test statistic is then applied 
to a normal distribution table to find a probability or p-value. 
Additional Discussion of Results 
The Appendix contains from additional results from the statistical software JMP®. 
Primarily, the distributions were not displayed. Therefore, to provide additional insight 
on how breakpoints were established for the contingency tables, the distributions are 
made available in the appendix. 
Interestingly, quality problems with the building foundation were significantly 
correlated with many other deficiencies and external environmental issues. Most 
significantly, projects that possessed foundation problems were also very likely to 
possess project management (r = 0.6365, p = 0.0001) and contract management (r = 
0.373, p = 0.025) problems as well .There was also association with increased safety 
deficiencies (r = 0.4542, p = 0.006), poor horizontal work (r = 0.3985, p = 0.022).  The 
relationship with horizontal work is intuitive; both often involving concrete. But the 
relationship with safety deficiencies is vague. Although it interesting to note that, of the 
six projects sited to possess foundation problems, 5 were located in the Kabul region. 
Many of the shop drawing and material submittal deficiencies were instances 
where the construction team deviated from the original design. Many times, the 
construction team declared the change technically acceptable and a retroactive design 
change was accepted by the government. While these deficiencies may have ultimately 
met the intent of the project, this issue suggests that there may be disagreement between 
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the design engineers’ vision and the true capability of the construction team (whether it 
be material availability or level of skill possessed by the labor force). These unnecessary 
processes ultimately take attention away from the project by the staff, as well as the 
quality assurance engineers, who have a due diligence to ensure that the project is built 
according to the approved design. Time and effort could be saved if the construction team 
coordinated with design staff to ensure the project is designed in such as way that it may 
also be built in a wartime environment. 
Electrical deficiencies were associated with an increase in contract modifications 
(r = 0.41, p = 0.01) and also correlated with poor material and submittal incident rate  
(r = 0.36, p < 0.05). The daily reports often cited electrical problems being the result of 
installing improper or unapproved material, and thus required rework. AFCEC also 
mentioned several instances where electrical work was the critical path line-item, and 
required FPOP extensions – which necessitate contract modifications. Additionally, being 
one of the more technical crafts of construction, the workers in a developing country like 
Afghanistan often did not initially possess the skills  necessary to complete the work, 
which required training and additional time; another cause for a modification. 
Nearly all of the crafts were correlated with safety deficiencies to some degree, 
but reportable safety incidents had some more unique relationships. Structural had the 
strongest relationship to deficiencies (r = 0.50, p < 0.01); it is noteworthy that falling and 
being struck by objects are among the most common types of construction accidents 
(OSHA, 2014). Safety incidents were also correlated to increase in external 
environmental issues besides security incidents (r = 0.48, p < 0.01) and also associated 
with increases in the awarded cost growth (r = 0.40, p < 0.05). 
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Structural deficiencies were strongly correlated to project management problems 
(r = 0.56, p < 0.001) and foundation deficiencies (r = 0.49, p < 0.01), as well as some 
other crafts. Aside from the foundation, the structural portion of the work must usually be 
completed before any further crafts can be begun. These results suggest that there may be 
a “bottle-neck” in the structural discipline which can more significantly affect the final 
cost of the project. It is also possible that larger,  more costly, projects also have more 
complex structural work, and therefore garner more scrutiny or challenges in the 
structural discipline. There may also be a mediating relationship shown by the 
relationship between project management and design performance (r = 0.32, p < 0.05).  
Oddly, mechanical problems correlated positively with project budget 
performance (r = 0.43, p < 0.05). Meaning that budget performance improved as 
mechanical deficiencies increased. Follow-up contingency tables tests were performed to 
see if this relationship could be explained. Mechanical showed to be very dependent on 
structural quality (p < 0.05) and interior finishing quality (p < 0.01). These factors did not 
explain the relationship to budget performance, but did confirm that interior finishing and 
structural design are critical to the successful installation of mechanical systems. It is 
possible that the correlation between budget performance was a coincidence of the data 
due to the smaller sample size and should be discarded. 
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V. Conclusion 
Chapter Overview 
 This chapter provides a summary of the results and significance of the thesis. 
There will be further discussion of future research that was not included in the scholarly 
articles, a review of the research findings as found in the two scholarly articles, some 
discussion on the significance of the research, and final concluding thoughts. 
Review of Findings 
 The two scholarly articles analyzed 25 AFCEC projects to search for answers to 
two research questions related to wartime construction projects, and their performance. 
The findings from the two articles provide excellent insight into wartime construction and 
also show the need for additional research on wartime construction projects, which will 
be discussed in a later section. 
The first research question asked, “Which factors affect the success of wartime 
construction projects?” The results from the first article showed that allowed schedule 
growth can predict budget performance. Additionally, when the construction agent gives 
additional time for a contractor to complete a project, this may actually increase the 
likelihood that a contractor will be late. Moreover, project management issues can be 
predictive of schedule performance, and through interviews and background information 
on project managers may improve future project performance. Finally, weather, security, 
culture, and other external environmental factors were not predictive of budget or 
schedule performance. 
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The second question investigated how wartime project outcomes differ based on 
the contract type (fixed-price or reimbursable). The results showed that reimbursable 
contracts take longer to complete and cost more than fixed price contracts. Fixed price 
contracts are more often plagued by design performance and contract management 
problems. However, the study found that there was no significant difference in 
construction deficiency occurrences. Additionally, there was no different in security or 
external environmental delays, which may be insightful for future contracts, given that 
reimbursable contracts were used because of increased project risk factors. 
Significance of Research 
 Wartime construction is an inherent activity in a nation-building effort, and it is 
likely that there will be a similar effort from the United States and coalition partners in 
future conflicts. It would be helpful for construction agents to manage a knowledge 
database which captures and distributes the lessons that can be learned from mistakes and 
successes of past wartime projects. However, if these lessons are not captured, the risk or 
repeating past mistakes will only be higher. This thesis addresses a small part of this 
knowledge base, and also serves to once again open discussion on the topic of wartime 
construction in the world of academia. It reminds construction agents that project 
management is a crucial function of a project to scrutinize. Additionally, budget auditing 
measures should be meticulously maintained by construction agents to control cost 
growth. Also, there are significant performance differences between fixed-price and 
reimbursable contracts, and there may be other suitable contract models – particularly 
with incentives – that would control cost and schedule growth in future projects. There 
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are many other opportunities for future research in wartime construction and continued 
knowledge-gathering is vital to the future success of all DoD construction agents.  
Additional Future Research 
This study focused on projects that were completely nation-building in purpose, 
which differed greatly from the conventional mission of AFCEC and USACE, which 
usually construct projects solely for US government use. Many of these government-used 
projects are still located outside of the United States; some are in war zones and some are 
not. A comparison of this program to government-used programs may reveal some key 
differences between how foreign, federal projects perform versus projects foreign 
projects that are designed for host-nation development. In the event that another long-
term nation-building effort is attempted by the United States and its allies, this 
comparison data may be useful in further discerning unique challenges to executing 
nation-building projects in a contingency environment. 
As shown by the literature review, one of the most common ways to search for 
primary causes of delay is by surveying construction professionals. This survey data is 
made stronger when compared with quantitative data. A survey could be developed to 
interview a mix of individuals who worked on this research program. AFCEC staff, 
quality assurance engineers, NTM-A staff, Prime Contractors, and even sub-contractors 
could be surveyed to find root causes of delays, quality problems, and cost overruns. 
Interviews could also be used, and combined with qualitative coding software, such as 
Atlas TI®. Many of these construction professionals are still tied to the program, but as 
the effort in Afghanistan comes to a close, they are moving to other jobs. Time is of the 
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essence to ensure that lessons from these subject matter experts can be captured in a 
useful way.  
Part of the data collection for this effort included the extensive schedules that are 
produced for larger projects. There were also many updates for each schedule between 
the beginning and end of each project. For this research, only minimal data was pulled 
from the schedules. There remains many additional insights into schedule execution that 
could be useful for the government in future efforts. A more expansive study (perhaps 
with a group) would be the comparison of the scheduled work to be completed with the 
daily reports and quantity of work actually completed. This would provide detailed 
earned value data, which may sometimes be different than that of the contractor-supplied 
cost and schedule data – due to the optimistic presentation often given by contractors 
when presenting their progress. 
Due to the vast amount of documentation that needed to be reviewed for the data-
mining in this research, only major deficiencies were coded for the contingency table 
analysis. However, case-studies could be performed for each individual project, or a 
small group of projects, which would allow for more detailed coding and root-cause 
analysis. There are several large projects (~$100 Million) that would be excellent 
candidates for this type of research, due to the diverse collection of challenges 
experienced. 
A regression model of a larger sample-size of Afghanistan projects could provide 
useful data comparison across AFCEC and USACE projects. It would allow for broader 
factors and differences to be analyzed for the entire country-building program. 
Additionally, comparison of the Afghanistan program to the Iraq program may also be 
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useful in order to include multiple nation-building efforts. Ultimately, this type of 
research would emphasize the analysis of project metadata, such as location, general size, 
contract execution method or agent, mission purpose, owner, year of construction, and 
other similar factors. This may provide high-level decision-makers key information when 
making decisions about how a large program should be managed. 
Quantifying the external environment was a difficult task of this research, and 
there remains much research to be done on this issue. Originally, the research included 
external environmental factors in order find whether or not these issues were indicative of 
overall performance or craft performance problems. This research can draw no such 
inferences because there were no significant relationships. Weather was the only external 
environmental issue that directly correlated with any other factors, and these relationships 
were not easily explained. Regarding security: every craft – with the exception of 
mechanical – correlated with security incidents. There wasn’t any reasonable explanation 
for these correlations. A third scholarly article was begun to perform root-cause analysis 
on external environmental factors. Unfortunately, the researching student did not have 
enough time to perform the analysis for this article. Should a future student want to 
continue this effort, the data is readily available.  
AFCEC also believes that the 365 POP, which is primarily end-user-driven, has a 
negative effect on the project schedule performance. Although, in this thesis, if a 
schedule extension was justified, a project was not necessarily considered behind, 
AFCEC believes that projects were thwarted by setting unrealistic schedules, and then 
inevitably forced to adjust. The effort required to reorganize and redistribute resources 
may have negatively affected a contractor when setting realistic schedules at the onset of 
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a project may not have had such a poor effect. Future research could compare NTM-A 
project to MILCON projects that were programmed by coalition customers. These 
MILCON projects did not require a strict 365 schedule. Rather they maintained more 
flexibility. Contractors for these projects rarely went over-schedule. It would be 
interesting to identify any performance differences between these types of projects. 
This research may have unintentionally answered the question, “What effect does 
a quality assurance program have on a construction project.”  AFCEC was very stringent 
regarding the use of a QA engineer on all sites, which often created additional 
complications and expenses for the NTM-A officials, due to the logistics of having a 
third-party contractor on-site to inspect all activities, and ensuring their personal safety. 
Conversely, USACE did not use QA engineers on many of their NTM-A projects and 
were also forced to terminate many projects for contractor default. (AFCEC only had one 
termination for default.) There was no research done in this thesis to compare 
performance of project that used QA engineers versus those that did not. However, the 
results of this research were dependent on the observations of the quality assurance 
engineers; and the logical results should validate that the QA engineers were adequately 
performing their duties and may have also been associated with positive performance of 
project. The correlation tests reflect strong relationships between deficiencies and the 
ultimate budget and schedule performance of the projects. Further research should be 
done to affirm whether or not quality assurance engineers actually reduce the risk in 
contingency construction projects, as this research suggests.   
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Summary 
This research explored performance factors that predicted performance and found 
performance differences between contract types. The purpose of this research was to 
understand wartime construction as it differs from peacetime construction, and how 
AFCEC executes an innovative and unique construction program with an very low 
contractor default record. The research methodology used 25 AFCEC-Afganistan projects 
for an in-depth review of project schedules and schedule updates, invoicing and earned-
value data, and thousands of daily project reports. The data were used to perform 
contingency table predictions, correlations, and pairwise median comparisons. This 
investigation shows that owner oversight may be the single most critical aspect to 
effectively controlling cost and schedule overruns in wartime projects. Additionally, it 
also shows that there are significant performance differences between reimbursable and 
fixed-price contracts in both cost and schedule, and virtually none in craft performance or 
delays from the external environment. Future recommendations are to ensure detailed 
cost controls, limit schedule extensions, reevaluate the design review process to eliminate 
wasted effort, develop detailed quality assurance programs that can track detailed 
progress levels, scrutinize and review all project managers, and consider incentive 
contracts to balance risk between owner and contractor. Overall, the analysis identifies 
ways to anticipate poor performance respond with improved methods to manage these 
wartime projects. 
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Appendix  
Distributions used to determine breakpoints 
 
Award Amount (AFCEC) 1 
 
 
Quantiles 
      
100.0% maximum 7.88e+7 
99.5%  7.88e+7 
97.5%  7.88e+7 
90.0%  7.2e+7 
75.0% quartile 3.23e+7 
50.0% median 1.7e+7 
25.0% quartile 1.27e+7 
10.0%  5188022 
2.5%  1201753 
0.5%  1201753 
0.0% minimum 1201753 
Summary Statistics 
    
Mean 25504853 
Std Dev 21372046 
Std Err Mean 4274409.3 
Upper 95% Mean 34326800 
Lower 95% Mean 16682906 
N 25 
 
 
Final Cost (AFCEC) 2 
 
 
0 20000000 50000000 80000000
0 20000000 60000000 100000000
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Quantiles 
      
100.0% maximum 1.07e+8 
99.5%  1.07e+8 
97.5%  1.07e+8 
90.0%  9.42e+7 
75.0% quartile 3.56e+7 
50.0% median 2.39e+7 
25.0% quartile 1.7e+7 
10.0%  5577743 
2.5%  1552538 
0.5%  1552538 
0.0% minimum 1552538 
Summary Statistics 
    
Mean 33189176 
Std Dev 28652137 
Std Err Mean 5730427.3 
Upper 95% Mean 45016197 
Lower 95% Mean 21362156 
N 25 
 
 
Awarded Cost Growth (Index) 3 
 
 
Quantiles 
      
100.0% maximum 2.20241 
99.5%  2.20241 
97.5%  2.20241 
90.0%  1.97066 
75.0% quartile 1.44088 
50.0% median 1.22923 
25.0% quartile 1.08193 
10.0%  1.00331 
2.5%  0.74669 
0.5%  0.74669 
0.0% minimum 0.74669 
Summary Statistics 
    
Mean 1.3214689 
Std Dev 0.3477724 
Std Err Mean 0.0695545 
Upper 95% Mean 1.4650223 
Lower 95% Mean 1.1779156 
0.5 1 1.5 2
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N 25 
 
 
Number of Contract Modifications (AFCEC/DR) 5 
 
 
Quantiles 
      
100.0% maximum 18 
99.5%  18 
97.5%  18 
90.0%  15.2 
75.0% quartile 12 
50.0% median 7 
25.0% quartile 6 
10.0%  5 
2.5%  4 
0.5%  4 
0.0% minimum 4 
Summary Statistics 
    
Mean 8.88 
Std Dev 3.9403892 
Std Err Mean 0.7880778 
Upper 95% Mean 10.506513 
Lower 95% Mean 7.2534873 
N 25 
 
 
Change Orders 5.1 
 
 
5 10 15 20
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Quantiles 
      
100.0% maximum 11 
99.5%  11 
97.5%  11 
90.0%  5.4 
75.0% quartile 4 
50.0% median 2 
25.0% quartile 1 
10.0%  0.6 
2.5%  0 
0.5%  0 
0.0% minimum 0 
Summary Statistics 
    
Mean 2.84 
Std Dev 2.3572583 
Std Err Mean 0.4714517 
Upper 95% Mean 3.8130284 
Lower 95% Mean 1.8669716 
N 25 
 
 
Initial Period of Performance (AFCEC/DR) 7 
 
 
Quantiles 
      
100.0% maximum 637 
99.5%  637 
97.5%  637 
90.0%  585.2 
75.0% quartile 535 
50.0% median 365 
25.0% quartile 262.5 
10.0%  182.8 
2.5%  178 
0.5%  178 
0.0% minimum 178 
Summary Statistics 
    
Mean 382.76 
Std Dev 142.09923 
Std Err Mean 28.419845 
Upper 95% Mean 441.41568 
Lower 95% Mean 324.10432 
200 300 400 500 600
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N 25 
 
 
Final Period of Performance (AFCEC/DR) 8 
 
 
Quantiles 
      
100.0% maximum 1715 
99.5%  1715 
97.5%  1715 
90.0%  1377.6 
75.0% quartile 1037 
50.0% median 741 
25.0% quartile 583 
10.0%  447 
2.5%  246 
0.5%  246 
0.0% minimum 246 
Summary Statistics 
    
Mean 822.84 
Std Dev 352.85676 
Std Err Mean 70.571351 
Upper 95% Mean 968.49211 
Lower 95% Mean 677.18789 
N 25 
 
 
Awarded Schedule Growth (Index) 9 
 
 
0 500 1000 1500
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Quantiles 
      
100.0% maximum 3.84758 
99.5%  3.84758 
97.5%  3.84758 
90.0%  3.36457 
75.0% quartile 2.69982 
50.0% median 2.07104 
25.0% quartile 1.57634 
10.0%  1.20149 
2.5%  0.98427 
0.5%  0.98427 
0.0% minimum 0.98427 
Summary Statistics 
    
Mean 2.1983988 
Std Dev 0.7528658 
Std Err Mean 0.1505732 
Upper 95% Mean 2.5091665 
Lower 95% Mean 1.887631 
N 25 
 
 
Security Incidents (DR) 11 
 
 
Quantiles 
      
100.0% maximum 18 
99.5%  18 
97.5%  18 
90.0%  17 
75.0% quartile 10 
50.0% median 3 
25.0% quartile 1 
10.0%  0 
2.5%  0 
0.5%  0 
0.0% minimum 0 
Summary Statistics 
    
Mean 5.32 
Std Dev 5.9632206 
Std Err Mean 1.1926441 
Upper 95% Mean 7.7814965 
Lower 95% Mean 2.8585035 
0 5 10 15 20
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N 25 
 
 
Other external environmental issue 11.1 
 
 
Quantiles 
      
100.0% maximum 47 
99.5%  47 
97.5%  47 
90.0%  25.2 
75.0% quartile 7.5 
50.0% median 1 
25.0% quartile 0 
10.0%  0 
2.5%  0 
0.5%  0 
0.0% minimum 0 
Summary Statistics 
    
Mean 6.6 
Std Dev 11.48187 
Std Err Mean 2.296374 
Upper 95% Mean 11.339483 
Lower 95% Mean 1.8605171 
N 25 
 
 
Weather (DR) 12 
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Quantiles 
      
100.0% maximum 77 
99.5%  77 
97.5%  77 
90.0%  69.2 
75.0% quartile 26.5 
50.0% median 12 
25.0% quartile 7 
10.0%  3.6 
2.5%  1 
0.5%  1 
0.0% minimum 1 
Summary Statistics 
    
Mean 20.32 
Std Dev 21.653945 
Std Err Mean 4.330789 
Upper 95% Mean 29.258309 
Lower 95% Mean 11.381691 
N 25 
 
 
Project Management 13 
 
 
Quantiles 
      
100.0% maximum 7 
99.5%  7 
97.5%  7 
90.0%  5.4 
75.0% quartile 2.5 
50.0% median 0 
25.0% quartile 0 
10.0%  0 
2.5%  0 
0.5%  0 
0.0% minimum 0 
Summary Statistics 
    
Mean 1.44 
Std Dev 2.1031722 
Std Err Mean 0.4206344 
Upper 95% Mean 2.3081468 
Lower 95% Mean 0.5718532 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
86 
    
N 25 
 
 
Contract Management 14 
 
 
Quantiles 
      
100.0% maximum 10 
99.5%  10 
97.5%  10 
90.0%  6.6 
75.0% quartile 3 
50.0% median 1 
25.0% quartile 0 
10.0%  0 
2.5%  0 
0.5%  0 
0.0% minimum 0 
Summary Statistics 
    
Mean 1.84 
Std Dev 2.7790886 
Std Err Mean 0.5558177 
Upper 95% Mean 2.9871514 
Lower 95% Mean 0.6928486 
N 25 
 
 
Design Performance (DR/T2) 15 
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Quantiles 
      
100.0% maximum 31 
99.5%  31 
97.5%  31 
90.0%  12.4 
75.0% quartile 9.5 
50.0% median 5 
25.0% quartile 2 
10.0%  0.6 
2.5%  0 
0.5%  0 
0.0% minimum 0 
Summary Statistics 
    
Mean 6.6 
Std Dev 6.4678693 
Std Err Mean 1.2935739 
Upper 95% Mean 9.2698052 
Lower 95% Mean 3.9301948 
N 25 
 
 
Material & Submittals (DR/T2) 16 
 
 
Quantiles 
      
100.0% maximum 28 
99.5%  28 
97.5%  28 
90.0%  15.2 
75.0% quartile 4.5 
50.0% median 2 
25.0% quartile 0 
10.0%  0 
2.5%  0 
0.5%  0 
0.0% minimum 0 
Summary Statistics 
    
Mean 4.4 
Std Dev 6.9880851 
Std Err Mean 1.397617 
Upper 95% Mean 7.2845398 
Lower 95% Mean 1.5154602 
-5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
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N 25 
 
 
Safety Deficiencies (DR) 17 
 
 
Quantiles 
      
100.0% maximum 24 
99.5%  24 
97.5%  24 
90.0%  8.8 
75.0% quartile 3.5 
50.0% median 1 
25.0% quartile 0 
10.0%  0 
2.5%  0 
0.5%  0 
0.0% minimum 0 
Summary Statistics 
    
Mean 2.76 
Std Dev 5.2700411 
Std Err Mean 1.0540082 
Upper 95% Mean 4.9353661 
Lower 95% Mean 0.5846339 
N 25 
 
 
Reportable Safety Incidents (DR) 17.1 
 
 
0 5 10 15 20 25
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89 
Quantiles 
      
100.0% maximum 5 
99.5%  5 
97.5%  5 
90.0%  3 
75.0% quartile 1 
50.0% median 0 
25.0% quartile 0 
10.0%  0 
2.5%  0 
0.5%  0 
0.0% minimum 0 
Summary Statistics 
    
Mean 0.76 
Std Dev 1.3 
Std Err Mean 0.26 
Upper 95% Mean 1.2966136 
Lower 95% Mean 0.2233864 
N 25 
 
 
Horizontal work (Concrete and/or Asphalt) - (DR/T2) 18 
 
 
Quantiles 
      
100.0% maximum 9 
99.5%  9 
97.5%  9 
90.0%  3 
75.0% quartile 1 
50.0% median 0 
25.0% quartile 0 
10.0%  0 
2.5%  0 
0.5%  0 
0.0% minimum 0 
Summary Statistics 
    
Mean 0.84 
Std Dev 1.9295941 
Std Err Mean 0.3859188 
Upper 95% Mean 1.6364973 
Lower 95% Mean 0.0435027 
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
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N 25 
 
 
Building Foundation (Concrete, Rebar, Soils) - (DR/T2) 19 
 
 
Quantiles 
      
100.0% maximum 28 
99.5%  28 
97.5%  28 
90.0%  8.4 
75.0% quartile 2.5 
50.0% median 1 
25.0% quartile 0 
10.0%  0 
2.5%  0 
0.5%  0 
0.0% minimum 0 
Summary Statistics 
    
Mean 2.92 
Std Dev 5.8375223 
Std Err Mean 1.1675045 
Upper 95% Mean 5.3296108 
Lower 95% Mean 0.5103892 
N 25 
 
 
Electrical (High and Low Voltage, Comm Lines/Outlets) - (DR/T2) 20 
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Quantiles 
      
100.0% maximum 28 
99.5%  28 
97.5%  28 
90.0%  14.4 
75.0% quartile 6 
50.0% median 1 
25.0% quartile 0 
10.0%  0 
2.5%  0 
0.5%  0 
0.0% minimum 0 
Summary Statistics 
    
Mean 4.08 
Std Dev 6.8063696 
Std Err Mean 1.3612739 
Upper 95% Mean 6.8895313 
Lower 95% Mean 1.2704687 
N 25 
 
 
Mechanical (HVAC, Gas, Boilers) - (DR/T2) 21 
 
 
Quantiles 
      
100.0% maximum 4 
99.5%  4 
97.5%  4 
90.0%  2.8 
75.0% quartile 1 
50.0% median 0 
25.0% quartile 0 
10.0%  0 
2.5%  0 
0.5%  0 
0.0% minimum 0 
Summary Statistics 
    
Mean 0.56 
Std Dev 1.1575837 
Std Err Mean 0.2315167 
Upper 95% Mean 1.0378271 
Lower 95% Mean 0.0821729 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
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N 25 
 
 
Utility (Water, Sewer, and Storm) - (DR/T2) 22 
 
 
Quantiles 
      
100.0% maximum 11 
99.5%  11 
97.5%  11 
90.0%  6.2 
75.0% quartile 2.5 
50.0% median 1 
25.0% quartile 0 
10.0%  0 
2.5%  0 
0.5%  0 
0.0% minimum 0 
Summary Statistics 
    
Mean 1.88 
Std Dev 2.7282473 
Std Err Mean 0.5456495 
Upper 95% Mean 3.0061651 
Lower 95% Mean 0.7538349 
N 25 
 
 
Structural (Masonry, Steel, and Wood) - (DR/T2) 23 
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93 
Quantiles 
      
100.0% maximum 20 
99.5%  20 
97.5%  20 
90.0%  10.8 
75.0% quartile 4 
50.0% median 1 
25.0% quartile 0 
10.0%  0 
2.5%  0 
0.5%  0 
0.0% minimum 0 
Summary Statistics 
    
Mean 3.28 
Std Dev 4.8863756 
Std Err Mean 0.9772751 
Upper 95% Mean 5.2969967 
Lower 95% Mean 1.2630033 
N 25 
 
 
Interior Finishing (Doors, Tiles, Walls, Ceilings, Bathroom Fixtures, Paint) - 
(DR/T2) 24 
 
 
Quantiles 
      
100.0% maximum 5 
99.5%  5 
97.5%  5 
90.0%  3 
75.0% quartile 2 
50.0% median 0 
25.0% quartile 0 
10.0%  0 
2.5%  0 
0.5%  0 
0.0% minimum 0 
Summary Statistics 
    
Mean 0.92 
Std Dev 1.3820275 
Std Err Mean 0.2764055 
Upper 95% Mean 1.4904729 
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Lower 95% Mean 0.3495271 
N 25 
 
 
Exterior finishing (Windows, Exterior doors, Garage Doors, Fences) - 
(DR/T2) 25 
 
 
Quantiles 
      
100.0% maximum 4 
99.5%  4 
97.5%  4 
90.0%  1.4 
75.0% quartile 1 
50.0% median 0 
25.0% quartile 0 
10.0%  0 
2.5%  0 
0.5%  0 
0.0% minimum 0 
Summary Statistics 
    
Mean 0.52 
Std Dev 0.9183318 
Std Err Mean 0.1836664 
Upper 95% Mean 0.8990687 
Lower 95% Mean 0.1409313 
N 25 
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